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TITUS QUINCTIUS FLAMININUS:
IMPERIALISM AND THE PURSUIT OF AUCTORITAS
Jeffrey S. Volcheck, MA 
University of Nebraska, 2002
Advisor: Dr. Charles King
In the early second century BC, Rome built an empire that encompassed the 
Western Mediterranean basin and most of the Italic Peninsula. The necessity of using 
manpower provided by Italian treaties, the desire for economic gain, the differing 
treatment of Eastern and Western peoples, and especially, the political competition 
among the nobiles all created the Roman imperialistic war-machine. Growth had its 
consequences, though, as the Hannibalic War diminished the number of qualified 
generals, which allowed younger men to assume command of the legions. These 
circumstances allowed Titus Quinctius Flamininus to rise swiftly through the ranks of 
Roman Republican politics and develop a highly successful career by exploiting the 
elements of Roman imperialism.
As Rome entered into a new stage of imperialistic development, Flamininus took 
advantage of the new situation, as Scipio had before him, to create a successful career. In 
accordance with standard cultural practices, Flamininus unerringly pursued auctoritas 
and personal benefit from the outset of his career. Throughout the Second Macedonian
and Spartan Wars he manipulated military and political scenarios to retain his command 
and settle those conflicts before another ambitious Roman could steal his glory. 
Following his martial exploits, Flamininus continued to compete for political 
preeminence through his diplomatic work in Greece prior to the Syrian War. After 
serving as censor, however, Flamininus wisely curtailed his political activity to prevent 
himself from being the object of jealous rivals.
Titus Quinctius Flamininus stands as a notable figure in Roman imperialistic 
history, whose involvement in Greece helped to continue the expansion of the fledgling 
empire. His actions in the East have been interpreted as being motivated by 
philhellenism and duty to allies among other reasons, but Flamininus found his 
motivation from the desire to effectively compete and succeed within the politico-cultural 
setting of the middle Republic.
To my wife Teresa, without your love and dedication, 
none of this would have been possible.
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1INTRODUCTION
Roman involvement in the East played a definitive role in the growth and collapse 
of the Republic, and arguably, the survival of Rome after the Western Empire had fallen. 
Although the reasons why Rome concerned herself with Eastern affairs have been 
debated endlessly, when Republican Rome encountered states in the East during a period 
of expansion, she proved herself to be militarily superior to them in every conflict. 
Minor wars with Illyria and Macedon led finally Rome into the Second Macedonian War, 
which established Rome as a perpetual participant in Eastern affairs. After assuming the 
consulship in 198,1 Titus Quinctius Flamininus appears as a pivotal figure in Roman 
expansion into the East and his impact cannot be underestimated. He spent five years in 
Hellas fighting two wars before returning to Rome as, arguably, the greatest man in the 
Republic, albeit for a short time.
It seems unnecessary to explain the actions of Flamininus as being motivated by 
philhellenism, or long-term foreign policy goals, because his motives can be better 
explained as the actions of an ambitious politician attempting to use the mechanisms of 
Roman imperialism to advance his short-term career goals within the context of the 
political system of the second-century Roman Republic. He likewise cannot be 
dismissed simply as an instrument of the government, performing consular functions 
prescribed to him by the Senate.
Ambition propelled him to seek the highest public honors of the Republic, and 
Roman imperialism provided the environment for Flamininus to reach his goals. The 
quest for gloria and auctoritas induced Flamininus to stay in Greece until he had
2vanquished Philip V of Macedon, and then Nabis of Sparta. Even after returning to 
Rome, Flamininus could not quench his desire for more prestige. The Senate appointed 
him as an Eastern ambassador in order to retain Greek allied support against the 
propagandist campaigns of Antiochus and the Aetolians. Though Flamininus toiled in 
the interests of Rome, at the same time he began to overstep the boundaries of his office 
in pursuit of further gloria. Yet despite these “transgressions,” he remained popular and 
influential. The cultural maxims of Roman politics compelled Flamininus to push the 
limitations of his place and his authority in the Republic.
Although not the focus of this thesis, an important point must be briefly touched 
on concerning Flamininus5 long-term impact on the Republic. While advancing Roman 
expansion, Flamininus5 political career illustrated trends that would continue and would 
later contribute to the accumulation of power by generals such as Sulla or Marius, who 
would pose such a significant threat to the stability of the Republic. Although he had 
planned nothing insidious and did not possess the wherewithal to become a Sulla -  even 
if that had been his intention -  his actions demonstrated how the acquisition of personal 
gloria in a growing empire clashed with oligarchic control. In the time of Flamininus, 
the Senate held too much power for him to be more than a servant of the state; but his 
career effectively foreshadows what is to come.
SOURCES
Before delving more deeply into the subject at hand, we must consider the 
primary sources, which for this period of Roman history are paltry at best. Little remains 
for the historian, student, or dilettante to use for investigation. What has come down to
3us, of any real length, is to be found in Polybius, Livy, and Plutarch, with some additional 
evidence available in Appian, Dio Cassius, Diodorus and others.
Polybius had been a statesman and military leader in the Achaean League until 
the conclusion of the Third Macedonian War. The Romans deported him back to Italy as 
one among 1,000 hostages chosen for their high social standing. By good fortune, 
Polybius befriended the young Scipio Aemilianus and joined the famed Scipionic Circle. 
It was during this time and under this influence that Polybius learned about the Rome he 
wrote of in his Histories, which sought to explain how the Romans came to rule the 
world in a mere 53 years/
Scholars take Polybius (200-118) as the most reliable source for Roman 
expansion in the East, as he lived within the scope of most of the events. In reaction to 
the contemporary trend in historical composition where historians sacrificed truth for 
dramatization and sensationalism, he presented his Histories in a more analytical and 
logical format, following the Thucydidean tradition of interviewing participants in the 
events, studying the geography, scrutinizing the available sources, and drawing on his 
own experience as a military and political leader. Although Polybius did not strictly 
adhere to this style, his methodology allowed him to present a more accurate account 
than his contemporaries most of the time.3
The modem historian, however, cannot use Polybius without noting his biases. 
He composed The Histories mostly for a Greek audience to explain how Rome 
accomplished her conquests. His central premise presents Rome as superior to Greece in 
terms of organization of her government and military, which led to Rome’s success. As a
4matter of thematic continuity in the Histories, Polybius omits much of the political 
infighting among the nobiles. Still, Polybius catered to his Roman patrons. While in 
Rome, he remained a political prisoner, and then afterward a client of the Scipios, and as 
a consequence, his narrative ignored much of the political intrigue between Roman 
nobles. He never questioned Roman policy and naturally went to some lengths to praise 
the Scipio clan. Peter Green has also assailed Polybius as being a propagandist, Rome’s 
spokesman who overemphasized the importance of Greece in Roman affairs. The use of 
Tyche, or Fortune, remains the last drawback found within Polybius. Often when the 
results of events seem outrageous or unlikely, Polybius attributed their result to Tyche. 
Despite all of these things, Polybius remains our only extensive, extant contemporary.4
Livy (59 BC-17 AD), the source with the largest volume of information, typically 
ranks next in terms of quality. A Paduan, Livy never participated in public affairs and 
seems to have been an historian exclusively. Modem historians have attacked him as 
unreliable, and in truth, Livy presents many problems for modem scholars. He had a 
poor knowledge of military affairs and often simplified battles for the reader. 
Chronological mistakes abound, as do mistranslations of Greek. In much of his work, 
Livy followed annalists, who added or eliminated events, changed chronology to suit 
their purpose, or simply invented things to maintain the flow in their narrative. Luckily, 
he relied mostly on Polybius for events in Greece and Macedon, but he put his own spirit 
into his writings, and molded Polybius for his own intentions and view of history. Livy 
saw his Rome as a place of fallen morality, and ethical instruction drove his writing as
5much as the telling of an accurate history. On the other hand, Livy provides important 
data on Roman religion and politics, not to mention the Roman mindset.5
The simple fact remains, however, that he is the only source remaining for some 
events. Polybius may be more reliable in terms of his methods or his nearness to the 
events related, but in terms of the Second Macedonian War, only fragments of Polybius 
exist. It behooves the historian to note them, and then continue on. In a discussion of 
Maurice Holleaux, P. S. Derow aptly comments on the futility' of try ing to discover what 
Livy took from Polybius versus what he took from other historians.6 Livy possesses 
problems and errors and cannot be taken at face value without examination, yet he must 
be discussed. This investigation of Flamininus will necessitate the use of Livy for a large 
part of its content, because not enough of Polybius remains intact.
Finally, Plutarch (46-120 AD) stands as the third most important source, yet he is 
a biographer recording history as a means to moral instruction, and this presents obvious 
problems for the modem historian. Especially taxing is Plutarch’s inclination to follow 
proper chronology only loosely for the sake of reinforcing a specific theme. At times he
n
rearranged events to suit his ethical paradigm. In addition, Plutarch tended to portray 
flaws in his Roman subjects when comparing them to famous Greeks. Flamininus 
himself never quite measures up to Philopoemen. The Lives contain much vital material 
not found in other sources, but one must attempt to determine what factual data he altered 
or sacrificed in order to convey his moral. Nonetheless, Plutarch, like Livy, remains one 
of the few sources left to the modem historian for this period, and is important to the 
study of Flamininus.8
6IMPERIALISM
Before continuing on to explore more completely the impact that Flamininus had 
in his dealings with Macedonia and Greece, we should establish our view of Roman 
imperialism. A number of perspectives exist, both in modem scholarship and the ancient 
sources, regarding Roman imperialism.
What does it mean to be imperialistic? Erich Gruen gives an interesting 
discussion of the evolution of the term, but does not define it.9 For this study, 
imperialism will be defined as the expansion of Roman power, whether for economic, 
territorial, strategic, or political interests -  or any combination thereof -  through the 
control, directly or indirectly, of other peoples. Conquest of enemies does not necessitate 
annexation of land, but it does mean that Rome manipulated them, as best they could, by 
some means.
Many different viewpoints on the nature of Roman imperialism exist in modem 
study. Major scholars, like Frank, Scullard, and Gruen -  to mention a few — propound 
the theory' that Rome did not want to interfere in overseas affairs, and specifically not in 
the East. Each of them may have a slightly different twist on why the Romans eventually 
did become involved in Macedon and Greece, but none strays from the overall idea that 
Rome was non-interventionist or non-expansionist in nature.
For some, fear stands as the primary motivation behind Rome’s imperialism. The 
Romans developed a fear of invasion, most likely from their experiences in the sack of 
the city by Gallic Brennus and the Senones in 387. The intrusion by Hannibal in 218 
only reinforced this phobia. For these scholars, such as Badian and Scullard, Rome
7became involved in the Second Macedonian War mainly out of fear that a stronger Philip 
might invade the Italic peninsula at a time of Roman weakness.10 Mommsen, Errington 
and Dickson, however, see Rome as acting out of protection for her interests. Philip V 
had taken land from Roman allies, and endangered shipping lanes by Macedonian or 
Illyrian piracy.11 Tenney Frank asserted that the Roman people favored expansion and 
bent the nobility to its will at times, even though the oligarchy remained defensively 
minded.12
And finally Gruen believes that the intrigues of Macedon, Greek poleis, and other
Hellenistic states drew Rome into Hellenic affairs. In this theory, Rome becomes
involved, and then tries to disentangle herself, only to be convinced to intervene again.
Roman military intervention resulted from Rome trying to settle events to prevent further
11dealings in the region.
At the other end of the spectrum, William Harris stands as the foremost proponent 
of Roman expansion being a result of conscious Roman aggression. Harris views the 
Romans as a naturally war-like people whose culture drove them to conquer their 
neighbors and expand their territory. But he also posits financial gain as a powerful 
reason, as Roman citizens, soldiery, and senators all condoned war for the taking of 
booty, and later, slaves.14 Harris makes sound points in his easily more convincing 
economic argument than he does by claiming that the Romans were simply a more brutal 
people than others in the ancient world.15
Although, these theories contain strong points, none of them seems suitable in 
their entirety, so rather than reducing Roman expansion to a single explanation, a
8composite model seems more appropriate as many factors played a part in Rome creating 
an empire that eventually encompassed the Mediterranean world. This model embraces 
the premises of economic gain and protection of Roman interests, while rejecting the 
notions of non-expansionism and fear, just mentioned above, as aspects of imperialism. 
At the same time, several theories not mentioned, including Italian alliances, Roman 
treatment of Eastern versus Western states, and the role of political competition, shall be 
introduced into the model to provide a more complete analysis of Roman imperialism.
Four major reasons exist as to why the Romans became imperialistic. First, they 
had developed a series of treaties with numerous Italian states -  due to conquest or 
alliance -  which required the state to provide troops whenever Rome needed them for 
war. This provision existed no matter what the status of the people, and allowed Rome, 
almost nonchalantly, to use war as an instrument of foreign policy at any time. The 
Italian allies were estimated to be able to provide up to 360,000 men (Polyb. 3.24). Thus, 
Rome could absorb heavy loss of life, as they had a gigantic pool of reserves from which 
to draw. The allies were responsible for most of the cost of arming and provisioning their 
men, so Rome imposed a light annual tribute upon them. This situation allowed the 
Romans to create an immense military machine at a low cost to themselves.
If many of the allies had become part of the system by force due to defeat in 
warfare, Rome nonetheless experienced few major allied uprisings for hundreds of 
years.16 The system survived and thrived because Rome supported allied aristocracy in 
times of local insurrection, as events at Arrentium in 302 (Livy 10.3-5) and Lucania in 
296 (Livy 10.18.8) provide examples. Also, the allies received shares of booty in the
9form of money, land, and slaves.17 Once the system had become established, the Romans 
had to go to war on a regular basis in order to keep drawing troops, and thus, keep the 
system intact. If Rome had forgone war for several years, then her allies would miss the 
opportunity to capture booty, yet still had to pay a tribute and this could have led to 
uprisings. So war had to be sought out, just to keep the peninsula stable. In truth, Rome 
only benefited from her empire by going to war and requisitioning troops because she
1 fionly levied a small amount of money.
Second, simple economics pushed Rome into being imperialistic. As Harris 
wrote, “economic gain was to the Romans (and generally in the ancient world) an integral 
part of successful warfare and of the expansion of power.”19 For the people, farmland 
proved to be an important spoil in the Italian Wars, and piracy against Italian merchants 
can be considered a reason for both Illyrian Wars.20 Most Romans and Italians benefited 
economically from war. The gains that people received did not result from a 
premeditated senatorial policy, but because of a collective self-interest on the part of 
individuals. Soldiers gained booty by successful campaigns, and pains were taken to 
make sure that allies received equal shares. Slavery had become a vital industry in the 
fourth century, and victories in war kept slaves coming into Rome,21 and war-making 
industries such as arms manufacturing, tanning, and tailoring all greatly benefited as a 
result by providing equipment for annual campaigns. Although Rome did not fight to 
establish trading posts, these economic centers became a natural aftereffect in the wake of 
Roman victory. Senators and equites acquired land, and especially later on, publicani 
(private contractors) had more areas from which to collect taxes, with the shadow of
10
Rome engulfing the Mediterranean world. Again, money from expansion later funded 
public works projects and temples.22
Third, as per the definition given earlier [the expansion of Roman power, whether 
for economic, territorial, strategic, or political interests, or any combination thereof, 
through the control, directly or indirectly, of other peoples] Rome sought to increase her 
influence over her neighbors, but as Badian astutely points out, she did it differently in 
the West than in the East. Since Rome believed herself to be culturally distant from the 
Celts, Gauls and Spaniards, she naturally implemented more violent means to augment 
her control in the West. As Rome did not see the Western peoples as civilized, she rarely 
availed herself of diplomatic tools in dealing with them, and thus engaged in almost 
constant warfare for most of the second century to subdue them.
Rome, however, identified more closely at a cultural level with the Greeks and 
Syrians, just as she had with the Carthaginians. The Eastern peoples had developed 
robust economies, complex political structures and social hierarchies; they were civilized 
states. Because of this familiarity, Rome tended to establish hegemonic control over 
them with treaties and agreements of amicitia (friendship) after defeating them. For 
example, when Rome won the Hannibalic War, she did not govern Carthage through 
continual belligerence, but instead directed Carthaginian foreign policy: Carthage had to 
have Roman permission to wage war inside and outside her territory (Polyb. 15.17.3-7; 
Livy 30.37.1-6). Flamininus later followed this theory utilizing diplomacy to settle 
finally the conflicts with Philip, and later with Sparta as well, after he had first exacted a
11
military solution. He had no intention of conquering Hellas, as Caesar would later 
conquer Gaul, and the Senate had no expectation of this either.
Finally, Flamininus existed in a world of extreme competition for the prizes of 
power and recognition. Roman nobles spent their lives vying to gain a chance at 
attaining prestige and glory for themselves and their families and this task proved to be 
difficult for most, and impossible for some.
A Roman became involved in politics in the hope of increasing his dignitas, his 
personal reputation of public honor and esteem. Although working in the law courts, 
passing legislation, and capturing the lower magistracies did allow a man to increase his 
dignitas, these things counted primarily as stepping-stones towards the highest political 
honors.24 Of course, attaining a quaestorship or tribunate might have been a mark of 
great prestige among some novi hominis, or families with a lower social standing, but to 
capture the greatest accolades meant going further up the cursus honorum. A Roman 
normally had to ascend certain stepping-stones -  becoming a quaestor, then serving as an 
aedile, followed by election as a praetor -  before he designated himself prepared for the 
state’s highest office, the consulship. Once elected consul, a Roman joined an elite 
group, which increased his own dignitas and the prestige of his family. Having been 
consul, however, guaranteed nothing for Romans looking to gain auctoritas, public 
prestige and respect. This does not mean that being consul meant he had no auctoritas, 
but that to become truly powerful and influential on the political scene later required 
something more.
12
The real goal of any consul was to be granted a military command by the Senate. 
Only on the field of battle did a consul have the opportunity to attain enough gloria and 
laus -  glory and praise -  to magnify his dignitas and auctoritas, and put him above his 
peers on the social ladder. Like all generals, the consul wanted victory, but even more 
importantly, he must achieve a memorable victory. The destruction of 5,000 or more 
enemy troops in a battle usually met the standard requirement for being granted a triumph 
by the Senate, and a triumph stood not just as a mark of success, but of immense 
success. Great gloria and laus came from its celebration, and thus the accumulation of 
dignitas and auctoritas,2' though there existed no guarantee that the Senate would vote 
the triumph to a conquering general. Becoming a great man entailed the following tasks: 
becoming a consul, serving in a war, defeating the enemy significantly, and celebrating a 
triumph as a result.
Flamininus, like so many before and after him, chose to attempt this path. As will 
be shown in detail later, Flamininus achieved the consulship with the help of powerful 
friends, and their continued aid, as well as his own maneuvering, kept him in Greece long 
enough to overcome Philip V. After three years of war with Macedon, Flamininus had 
virtually assured himself of a triumph after winning at Cynoscephalae, yet he forced 
hostilities upon Sparta to gather in even more gloria.
Going through this process successfully was not an easy feat. The steep road to 
auctoritas contained many pitfalls and obstacles, since aristocrats were also encouraged 
to pursue inimicitiae, enmity, against their rivals in the public arena.28 This enmity could 
be displayed in many ways, such as breaking off social contact, joining a faction of one’s
13
enemies in order to hinder his attempts to get elected or block his actions once in office, 
or even to prosecute him in a court of law.29 Not only did Romans exhibit inimicitiae in 
various ways, but they also entered into it for numerous reasons: violating relationships 
based upon trust or obligation, interfering with the career of another, or attacking 
clients.30
Yet invidia -  which translates as jealousy -  stands, perhaps, as the most common 
reason of them all for inimicitiae. Romans who reached the highest spires of political 
greatness also became the largest targets for inimicitiae, making themselves the objects of 
constant attack, as the nobiles all feared the concentration of too much power in one 
man’s hands. Individuals might work to become successful generals and then powerful 
members of the Senate, but at the same time they knew that the more auctoritas they 
accumulated, the more invidia they created among their peers. One man with a great 
amount of auctoritas wielded a large amount of power, thus curtailing the influence of 
others. The development o f invidia, which resulted in inimicitiae, served as a natural 
check against the reappearance of a rex: a king. Members of the upper class targeted 
actions by an individual who seemed too powerful, or who worked too much towards the 
benefit of himself.31
What of those consuls who failed on the battlefield, a legitimate query as the 
legions returned many times as the defeated? Nathan Rosenstein dealt with this specific 
question in his work Imperatores Victi. In a world of such intense political competition 
for renown, one would naturally think that those commanders who returned to Rome in 
defeat would then fall by the wayside politically, because they had not achieved gloria.
14
What better way to reduce the number of competitors for high office? Men who lost 
wars, however, still played a necessary part in Roman government. The “elimination” of 
the imperatores victi from the forum and Senate as viable participants could only narrow 
the field of candidates, thereby allowing power to be concentrated in the hands of fewer 
individuals and for this reason, was resisted. Rosenstein also argues that the continuance 
of the imperatores victi in the political arena occurred because of two cultural factors 
deeply ingrained in the Roman psyche.32
The first was the impact of religion upon defeat. Rosenstein wrote, “WTar and 
religion were inseparable at Rome.”JJ The Romans carried out elaborate rites in the form 
of sacrifices, vows, auguries, and auspices, in order to appease the gods before going to 
war, and they watched religious ceremonies with great scrutiny. Mistakes in performing 
a rite caused it to be repeated and, sacrifices and auguries that portended negative 
outcomes were also sometimes redone in order to find a more positive answer. A 
fortuitous ceremony did not guarantee victory for the consul, however, but indicated that 
the pax deorum -  peace of the gods -  remained intact. Once a defeat had occurred, then 
the actual mechanics of the ritual implementation were closely examined. Often times, 
priests discovered a convenient flaw in the performance of the ceremony, however many 
people from all levels of society took part in the performance of rites, and so enemies, 
and even friends, of the defeated general could thus be open to blame. Members outside 
the upper class usually took the political fall, and errors in the religious realm might 
nullify the culpability of the defeated, keeping them in the political arena.34
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The second factor was placing the blame for the defeat upon the soldiers. The 
commander blamed poor discipline or lack of courage on the part of the men serving as 
the cause of a loss on the battlefield. Romans expected soldiers to follow orders 
unflinchingly and stand their ground unless ordered to retreat, yet the fierceness of hand- 
to-hand combat created an environment in which emotion could easily overpower 
discipline. Soldiers who disobeyed or fled incurred blame, thus keeping the losing 
general in the maelstrom of Rome politics despite defeat. Safety valves of this kind 
relieved the pressure for imperatores victi, who vied for a powerful spot in the political 
scene.
Such a political system, deeply infused with cultural mores, had crafted an 
environment wherein Romans fought to increase their personal standing and power 
through election to office and conduct of war. Jealousy and hatred developed as the 
upper class jockeyed for position. Some men fell victim to their opponents and to 
circumstance, while many others survived because of natural checks built into the system. 
This maintained the competition necessary to prevent any one individual from accruing 
too much influence, and at the same time sustained a system that permitted Rome to 
acquire an empire.36
Flamininus could work for his goals knowing that he had built-in scapegoats to 
blame for almost any mistake he might make during his operations. This did not, 
however, relieve him from the machinations of others. Throughout his campaigns in 
Macedonia and Greece, Flamininus constantly had to worry about invidia, which might 
lead to attacks from Rome. For example, as 197 dawned, his enemies tried to steal the
16
Macedonian command away from him. He had not failed in his duty; he had in fact 
beaten Philip at Aous Valley, but he had not concluded the war. Thus Flamininus’ 
friends in Rome worked to gain him a proconsular command to finish the war, while his 
enemies sought to wrench it from him. Newly-elected consuls attempted to supplant him 
in the Macedonian theater in 196 and 195, as well. His status kept him a target for 
jealousy even towards the end of his career, as Cato expelled Flamininus’ brother Lucius 
from the Senate in an attempt to injure Flamininus’ auctoritas in a roundabout way.
Flamininus can also be seen as a part of a much larger trend of political change in 
the late Republic. Eventually, men like Marius, Sulla, Pompey and Caesar tore apart the 
Republic with their strivings after power and gloria. Yet, it is difficult to determine 
whether any of these men actually desired acclaim and influence more than Flamininus or 
Scipio did in a younger Rome. What helped to change the political realities between the 
time of Flamininus and that of Caesar? I believe the relationship between the Senate and 
the magistrates holds the key.
The Senate managed the raising of troops, collection of supplies, and logistics of 
travel, just to name a few of its duties.37 In the field, the commander had leeway to make 
decisions based on the situation at hand, but in early Roman wars against Latin tribes and 
Gauls, the Senate issued orders that they expected the consul to follow, if possible.38 Of 
course, circumstance did not always grant the wishes of the Senators, and this is not to 
say that the Senate normally controlled the decisions of the commander in the field. Yet, 
campaigns in Italy never took place far from Rome, and the Senators could be called 
upon for aid or advice within a short period of time, if needed. The Senators trusted that
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a fellow member of the Senate possessed the necessary skills to conduct a war and would 
perform in the best interests of the state. At the same time, they recognized the 
potential for a single man to become more powerful politically after defeating an enemy, 
but invidia and inimicitiae provided checks against any man rising too high. Overseas 
commands changed this, however, affecting the realm of competition in an unforeseen 
manner.
Until the last years of the Hannibalic War, fighting had not involved a commander 
holding imperium for an extended period of time outside of Italy. Yet Scipio held 
imperium for his entire time in Africa, and Flamininus himself possessed imperium for 
five straight years in Greece. These extended commands allowed opportunities for men 
like Scipio and Flamininus to greatly magnify their dignitas and auctoritas in strange, 
exotic places where other members of the upper class had little, if any, experience. 
Defeating Celts and Gauls was celebrated, but these accomplishments did not hold the 
same mystique or prestige as the overseas provinces did. Men like Scipio and Flamininus 
returned to Rome with enhanced power and influence, and the desire to exert it. But 
Flamininus impacted Roman history7 beyond mere personal achievement or short-term 
foreign affairs; his actions had major repercussions to the continued growth of the empire 
and the eventual fall of the Republic. He, along with Scipio, pushed political competition 
and the use of personal power to a higher level, one that the great men of the later 
Republic equaled, and then greatly surpassed.
After five years of successful warfare and diplomacy in Hellas, Flamininus 
decided upon Roman hegemony for Greece instead of annexation. Modems afforded the
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benefits of hindsight may cringe at the fact that Flamininus might have saved Rome fifty 
years of fighting and politicking if he had simply proposed annexation of Macedonia and 
Greece instead. The four imperialistic motives previously cited influenced Flamininus to 
implement a hegemonic settlement on the Hellenes rather than inflicting continuous 
campaigns upon them. These four motives -  with the exception of Rome’s treaties with 
the Italians, which simply provided the resources to continually wage war -  provided the 
framework from which previous commanders created postwar settlements, and these 
former settlements presented Flamininus with two options: profit through annexation and 
the desire for hegemonic control.
When looking at the models available to Flamininus, first we turn to occasions 
where Rome annexed areas of defeated nations, but it must be noted that the peaces 
negotiated for the Punic Wars combined elements of both annexation and hegemony, 
(most likely because Carthage had represented a true threat to Roman security, whereas 
Macedonia and Illyria did not) and the former portion of the settlements will be examined 
here. After rejecting an earlier treaty of the First Punic War, the comitia centuriata 
agreed to reparations of 3,200 talents along with control of Sicily and the islands in- 
between (Polyb. 1.62-63). The senators must have seen the possible Carthaginian 
possession of Sicily as a threat to their security, whether in terms of invasion or of 
blocking trade lanes. Rome acted to secure the major staging base in the Mediterranean 
closest to Italy, not to mention a new source of troops, taxes, and grain. Although Sicily 
became the first “Roman province,” Rome did not directly administrate it to a large 
degree for many years; instead, Roman officials relied primarily on established forms of
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government and jurisprudence.40 Rome took control of Sardinia and Corsica shortly 
thereafter. With Carthage exhausted from the war, the senators claimed these islands to 
weaken the power of Carthage, increase revenue, and have a larger base of Mediterranean 
operations. By 238, Rome had ousted them and taken control, and a debilitated Carthage 
was in 110 position to resist her.41
The peace ending the Hannibalic War was much harsher than the first, as Rome 
imposed an indemnity of 10,000 talents paid over a fifty-year period and confiscated 
Spain, and portions of Africa conquered during the war (the African lands were 
distributed to Rome’s African allies). Rome took possession of Spain to prevent 
Carthage from gaining a foothold in Europe, but more importantly to have access to the 
prolific mines throughout the region. Rome, however, found herself fighting war after 
war against the Spaniards, but she settled on this situation for two reasons. First, Spain 
represented a huge economic windfall in terms of both the mines and the plunder42 that 
Rome did not want to give up through a peace treaty. Second, as Badian argued, the 
Romans perceived the Spaniards to be barbarians who did not have the culture to 
understand or respect a negotiated settlement. Thus, as she had done with the Gauls, 
Rome engaged in almost yearly campaigns to subdue the Spanish tribes, and did not 
finish the task until the end of the second century.
A second can be seen when Rome shaped hegemonic settlements for the purpose 
of controlling problematic or threatening neighbors, and protecting allies. By placing 
limitations on defeated states, Rome protected her interests and maintained openings for 
further intervention. The First Punic War yields little in the way of hegemonic
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restrictions except forbidding Carthage from making war on Syracuse or her allies, and 
evacuating Sicily (Polyb. 1.62). The Illyrian Wars of 229-228 and 220-219 -  which 
resulted from increased Illyrian piracy that threatened Italian trade routes in the Adriatic 
Sea -  offered an example of a very laissez-faire type of hegemony.43 Once Rome had 
defeated Queen Teuta in the first war, Illyria was restricted to using only two ships near 
Roman trading lanes in order to prevent piracy. Rome returned the recently expanded 
Illyria to its previous dimensions, and established a protectorate over Illyria and the 
surrounding Greek settlements.44 The Second Illyrian War came about because the 
Illyrian ruler Demetrius of Pharos had started his own campaign of expansion. He, not 
unlike Teuta, increased piracy in the Aegean and threatened Roman allies, and Rome 
swooped down on Demetrius (who escaped to Macedon) and quickly ended his aims 45 
The Romans did not add any territory, but simply stopped a threatening problem before it 
became too damaging to their commerce and relations with other states 46
The Hannibalic War offered a much more severe form of hegemony than the 
previous conflicts. Rome forced Carthage to strip her navy down to almost nothing, to no 
longer possess or train war elephants, to restore territory and goods to Masinissa and to 
enter into a treaty with him, and not to wage war inside or outside of Africa without prior 
permission from the Senate 47 Rome had seen the rebirth of Carthaginian power in Spain 
as a future threat. Rome might have humbled the maritime power before, but it had taken 
twenty-three long years, and a foe of that magnitude could not be allowed to reclaim her 
strength. So, Rome not only subjected Carthage to more than the extraction of wealth or 
the annexation of Spanish territory, but she also necessarily controlled Carthaginian
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foreign policy. Thus, Roman benefits were twofold: she accumulated more wealth and 
she placed Carthage under her dominion so the African nation could not regain power. 
Thus after Zama, Rome had eliminated the Carthaginians as a viable power in the 
Western Mediterranean, and this severe peace eventually led to the Third Punic War and 
the extinction of the Punic independence.
Thus, prior to the Second Macedonian War, Rome had used different methods in 
settling her overseas conflicts. She had annexed Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, and Spain for 
their strategic locations, and for the wealth they generated. When the seizure of land 
seemed overly difficult, unnecessary, or inappropriate (as in the case of dealing with
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Eastern and Western peoples ) she implemented sanctions to sustain some form of 
control over conquered states, as the cases of Carthage and Illyria demonstrate. The 
variability of each situation made every peace unique, and many factors determined the 
type of settlement the Romans used in managing the conquered. Thus, Flamininus had a 
plethora of examples to select from when it came time to deal with Macedonia after 
Cynoscephalae. He decided on a hegemonial arrangement rather than a provincial one, 
for the same reasons that Scipio resolved the Hannibalic War in that way. Macedonia 
and Greece were not nomadic, tribal societies like the Gauls and Celts, or even the 
Illyrians, whom the Romans managed with a few sanctions and the threat of force. 
Instead they had advanced cultures similar to Rome’s, and the Hellenes valued 
negotiation, whereas the Western peoples understood the sword. Flamininus identified 
with them culturally, and so, used diplomacy.
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In addition, without a distinct threat of invasion at the time of the Macedonian 
War, it is doubtful that Rome would have had the desire -  or could have forced the 
Italians -  to muster the numerous legions that would have been needed to reduce Greece 
completely. It had no immediate strategic value like Sicily. In addition, Greek loyalty 
was dubious and Pergamum, Rhodes, and even Egypt remained influential in the region, 
not to mention the resurrected Seleucid Empire had entered the area as a force to be 
reckoned with. The Roman people, too, had not been overly supportive of the 
Macedonian War at the outset, and it had taken three years just to comer Philip and 
defeat him. It seems very unlikely that the people, or the patres, would have supported 
an effort to turn Hellas into a province at this point. Finally, as Andrew Lintott notes, 
Rome tended to be tolerant of civilized rival powers at this time in Republican history, 
preferring to enforce hegemony rather than to create provinces.49
Attainment of gloria and auctoritas, however, persisted as the most influential 
factor on Flamininus’ career. As proceeding chapters will demonstrate, his actions 
exhibited an unfailing effort to successfully compete to reach the apex of authority, 
acknowledgment, and reputation in his culture. When obstacles intervened in his hunt for 
glory, he circumvented them by virtually any means, with little regard for the 
consequences they entailed for Rome.
THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
Before investigating Flamininus’ career in the Second Macedonian War, it is vital 
to review briefly the events of the First Macedonian War and Rome’s original 
intervention into the region. In 215 during the Hannibalic War, after the debacle at Lake
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Trasimene, Hannibal had signed a treaty with the Macedonian ruler Philip V, hoping that 
an eastern front could be opened against the Romans. As Philip had invaded Roman 
protectorates in Illyria, he looked menacing to many Romans after that pact became 
known, and the Senate declared war on Macedon to prevent Philip from becoming a new 
factor in the Hannibalic War. With theaters in both Italy and Spain, however, Rome did 
not have the manpower to transport an army to Macedonia, so she recruited the aid of the 
already embattled Aetolians and Achaean League to conduct it for her.
Once the First Macedonian War had begun, imperialistic intentions emerged. 
Rome kept a small fleet in Greece during the whole war, and a small contingent of 
Roman soldiers sacked Greek cities for loot in 205. The Senate had sent a 10,000-man 
army under Publius Sempronius to take command of the war effort in 205, but upon 
arriving he discovered that the Aetolian allies had just made peace with Philip.
This leads to the Second Macedonian War, and the time period that this thesis will 
focus upon. Historians have endlessly debated the causes of this conflict and its place in 
Roman imperialism.50 Scholars have promulgated many theories that attempt to absolve 
Rome of imperialistic intentions, yet these hypothesizes, which focus primarily on 
defensive or fear-related reactions to foreign states’ actions, seem less plausible than the 
Roman motivation for expansion.
In the wake of the First Macedonian War, Philip V began to expand Macedon’s 
position in the balance of Hellenistic powers, and the Eastern political situation involved 
numerous complex relationships. Philip wanted to reclaim Macedonian hegemony over 
Greece. He built up the Macedonian navy and became active in the Aegean, taking cities
24
to establish control of the Hellespont, and also acquiring areas in Illyria. He helped 
sponsor Aetolian pirates in return for a cut of the booty to build a fleet. Then, he turned 
on the Aetolians by refusing to cede territory to the Aetolian League that he had 
previously promised. As the Hannibalic War wound down, Philip became more daring in 
his raids into Greece and took control of trading lanes in the Adriatic. The efforts of 
Rhodes and Pergamum -  although these slowed him down for a time -  failed to stop 
Philip.
Earlier, in 203-02, the Aetolian League had sent an embassy to ask for Roman 
intervention against Macedon. The Senate gave no aid, as the Hannibalic War was still 
undecided. In fact, they harshly rebuked the Aetolians, against whom they still felt 
resentment for concluding the First Macedonian War without asking Rome (Livy 
31.31.20). But in 201, Attalus, ruler of Pergamum, came to the Senate with an embassy 
of Rhodians bringing news of Philip’s encroachment into Pergamese and Greek lands. 
Both the Pergamenes and Rhodians had been losing to Philip at sea, and now saw an 
alliance with Rome as the only way to ensure victory.51 Rome sent embassies to Greece 
to examine the situation. Soon after, an Athenian embassy arrived in Rome to complain 
about the aggression of Philip also. The Senate proposed a declaration of war, but the 
people voted down the declaration. Shortly thereafter, according to Livy (31.7), Publius 
Sulpicius Galba made a speech describing Philip as a second Pyrrhus, successfully 
inciting the people, and within three days, they ratified the declaration.52
Rome declared war on Philip for several reasons. Although he had grown in 
power, he actually represented a small threat to Italy, Rome had several allies to placate
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and commerce to protect, and the Senate, still harbored anger over Philip’s pact with 
Hannibal. Livy claims that they felt snubbed by Philip for the Treaty of Phoenice, though 
he also claims that they blamed the Aetolians for it (Livy 31.1.9-10). The latter seems 
more likely, as the treaty had prevented Rome from the further involvement that she had 
wanted: to send forces. Finally, the speech of Galba illustrates the economic and cultural 
motivations for the war.53 The Hannibalic War had left Rome exhausted, and yet legions 
continued to fight campaigns in Spain and Gaul. The drive to expand her influence -  
powered by greed, revenge and vanity -  pushed Rome into war with Macedon.
The first two years of the war produced mixed results. Neither Publius Sulpicius 
Galba in 200, nor Publius Villius Tappulus in 199, accomplished much against Philip. 
Galba did enjoy more success than Tappulus, whose harsh treatment of the Greek and 
Macedonian people actually damaged Roman support in the region, but any successes 
amounted to little in the whole of the conflict (Livy 31.23-32.8).
Roman fortunes in the region would change in 198, as the 29-year-old patrician 
Titus Quinctius Flamininus became consul, despite the efforts o f the tribunes named 
Fulvius and Manius to prevent it (Plut. Flam. 2; Livy 32.7.5-15). He entered into office 
during a time of empire building, where Rome gained an almost inexhaustible supply of 
manpower from treaties with Italian tribes, and moreover, the desire for wealth and 
control of her enemies pushed her into one war after another. Beyond that, the culture of 
political competition manufactured the career goals of the nobiles as generals wistful for 
success attempted to gain the consulship whereby they could secure a campaign to attain 
gloria and laus. These same factors that had propelled Rome to create that empire,
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especially the last one, molded the motivations and actions of Flamininus throughout his 
career, which was marked by the consistent pursuit for auctoritas, even to the point of 
putting himself before Rome in some cases.
27
INTRODUCTION ENDNOTES
1. Unless otherwise specified all dates are BC.
2. F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1957), 1-6.
3. Walbank, Commentary, 7-9.
4. Walbank, Commentary, 16-26; Peter Green, Alexander to Actiurn: The Historical 
Evolution o f  the Hellenistic Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 
269-85. Green finds Polybius’ tendency to fall back on Tyche for explanations to 
be a serious problem in his credibility, at times.
5. P. G. Walsh, Livy, His Historical Aims and Methods (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1961),
6. P. S. Derow, Greek Historical Documents: The Hellenistic Period (Chico: 
Scholars Press. 1987). 25-37.
7. R. H. Barrow, Plutarch and his Times (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press,
1967), 60-1; D. A. Russell, Plutarch (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd.,
1972), 14, 57-8.
8. C. P. Jones, Plutarch and Rome (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 54-59.
9. Erich S. Gruen, The Hellenistic World and the Coming o f  Rome (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984), 3-8.
10. Ernst Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1968), 3-4; H. H. Scuiiard, Roman Politics: 220-150 BC, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1973), 89-91.
11. Theodor Mommsen, History o f  Rome, vol. 2, trans. William Purdie Dickson (New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1898), 414-6; R. M. Errington, The Dawn o f
28
Empire: Rome’s Rise to World Power, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 3- 
4; Green, 435-436.
12. Tenney Frank, Roman Imperialism, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914), 
66-7, 106, 357.
13. Erich S. Gruen, 728-729; F. W. Walbank, The Hellenistic World: Revised Edition, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 230-6.
14. William V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome: 327-70 BC 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 41-53.
15. He reaches this conclusion by examining their actions in warfare. His notes
overflow with examples of Roman cruelty in the form of soldiers destroying cites, 
massacring surrendered peoples, and raping women (Harris, 52-3, 263-4).
Though his argument has force, Harris goes too far. Other peoples in the 
Mediterranean and its periphery practiced heartless acts as well. Two examples 
from Alexander’s career demonstrate that cruelty was not a Roman preserve. 
Alexander butchered men, women (\VhO were rap ed as \Vv!!)? and children m the 
razing of Thebes in 335 (Arr. 1.8; Plut. Alex. 11.12; Diod. 17.14) and Alexander’s 
army slaughtered every inhabitant of the Malli after Alexander suffered an arrow 
wound (Arr. 6.9.11; Diod. 17.98.3-99.4; Curt. 9.4.26-9.5.18; Plut Alex. 63.1-4.
A. B. Bosworth, Alexander and the East: The Tragedy o f  Triumph (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998) even makes the argument that Alexander was an overtly 
vicious man. Cruelty was neither a Roman preserve, nor a cultural trait specific to 
them alone, as examples of brutality by other peoples exist in plenty. The 
Akkadians demolished Nineveh and enslaved most of the population that survived 
and later, the Assyrian general Nabonidus slaughtered the inhabitants of Akkad. 
After capturing the city of Ekron, the Assyrian king Sennacherib slew the nobility 
and hung the corpses from poles, and Saigon II conquered and burned the city of 
Qartar, then had the rebels killed and the their king flayed (James B. Pritchard, ed. 
The Ancient Near East Volume I: An Anthology o f  Texts and Pictures (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1958), 195-203). Even the Greeks practiced extreme 
violence as the Athenians razed Melos and butchered the adult men after the 
Melians attempted to exit the Delian League (Thucv. 5.17.84-116).
16. T. J. Cornell, The Beginnings o f  Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the 
Punic Wars (c 1000-264 BC), London: Routledge, 1995), 365, A major uprising 
of the Falerii occurred 241 and a revolt of the Fregellae happened in 125. Rome 
quashed both with alacrity.
29
17. Cornell, 393-4.
18. Cornell, 364-8.
19. Harris, 56.
20. Gruen, 367; De Souza, 76-80.
21. Cornell, 393; Harris, 84.
1 1  T-T q rri c 1 00 -0 ^i  V  V  VS I *
23. Badian, Imperialism, 10-12.
24. Harris, 18-20.
25. Harris, 23.
26. Leslie Adkins and Roy A. Adkins, Handbook to Life in Ancient Rome, (New 
York: Facts On File, Inc., 1994), 91-2.
t  t  ____• r \ '"> r  "> az /. dam s, zu, z d - j v .
28. David F. Epstein, Personal Enmity in Roman Politics, 218-43 BC, (London: 
Croom Helm, 1987), 1-12.
29. Epstein, 64-89.
30. Epstein, 30-47.
31. Epstein, 48-54.
30
32. Nathan Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi: Military Defeat and Aristocratic
Competition in the Middle and Late Republic, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1990), 1-52.
33. Rosenstein, 54.
34. Rosenstein, 54-91.
35. Rosenstein, 92-113. It may be conjectured that poor discipline would reflect 
badly on a general: that he had performed his duties inadequately, thus causing 
the obedience of his men to falter. This is a strong, pragmatic argument, but the 
refutation lies in the culture of Roman oligarchic power. Almost all the generals 
came from the same class, and to keep a degree of parity among them, they had to 
propagate a myth of universally competent commanders. Finding fault in a 
general, except under very unusual circumstances, would put every leader under 
the suspicion of incompetence. That would be a grave mark against the rule of 
the oligarchy. In addition, it would bring into question the use of soldiers as a 
scapegoat when Rome lost in the field. Once more, the power of the patres could 
be found suspect and so the soldiers continued to shoulder the burden of the 
blame.
36. Rosenstein, 3, 168-73.
37. J. A. North, “The Development of Roman Imperialism,” JRS, 71 (1981): 8.
38. Arthur M. Eckstein, Senate and General: Individual Decision making and Roman 
Foreign Relations, 264-194 BC, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 
3-4.
39. Eckstein, 322-4
40. Andrew Lintott, Imperium Romanum: Politics and Administration (London: 
Routledge, 1993), 28-9, 38-9, 55-60; Frank, 92-106.
41. Errington, 32-4.
31
42. Leonard A. Curchin, Roman Spain: Conquest and Assimilation (London: 
Routledge, 1991), 19-20, 30-1, 136-8.
43. Polyb, 2.8; Gruen, 366-7; De Souza, 76-80.
44. Polyb. 12.11.4-2.12.3; App. III. 2.7; Gruen, 367. He does not think “protectorate” 
to be a proper term as Rome entered into amicitia with several of the poleis; the 
relationship was not formal as “protectorate” implies. Errington, 39, concurs with 
him on this point.
45. Polyb. 3.16.7-19, Appian III. 8, Zon. 8.20.
46. Gruen, 372-373.
47. Polyb. 15.18; Livy 30.29-35. Only Livy makes the statement concerning the 
elephants.
48. Badian, 7-12.
49. Lintott, 9..
50. Fear of Macedonian invasion does not convince, since Philip had a small navy 
and could not defeat the combined forces of Rhodes and Pergamum, let alone 
defeat the Roman navy and land an invasion force. Neither did Rome make 
preparations for an invasion when Philip’s aggressions became apparent to them. 
The breaking of clientship is also untenable as Rome did not defeat Philip in the 
First Macedonian War, but signed a treaty more beneficial to him than to her.
The circumstances of the treaty make it doubtful that the Romans held the 
Macedonians to be clients at this point. Defense of allies has been proposed, but 
the sources make no mention of it. Philhellenism is ludicrous (as we shall see 
later), and the hypothesis that Rome eventually dragged herself into the conflict as 
a matter of pride and improving her image in Greece lacks substance as well. 
Lastly, A. H. McDonald and F. W. Walbank, “The Origins of the Second 
Macedonian War,” JRS, 27 (1937): 206, resurrected the famous hypothesis of 
Maurice Holleaux concerning the pact between Philip and Antiochus as the cause 
of the Second Macedonian War. The theory has some strong points such as 
Rome’s fear that the combined might of the Philip and Antiochus would have 
been more formidable than the Macedonians alone. News of the pact is found in
32
many of the sources: Polyb. 15.20.2, 16.1.8, 16.10.1; Livy 31.14.5; App. Mac. 4. 
The rulers agreed to the treaty to can/e up the possessions of Ptolemy Philopater 
after his death, yet the sources do not indicate any intention by the rulers to invade 
Rome as a coalition. As J. P. V. D. Balsdon criticizes in “Rome and Macedon, 
205-200 BC,” JRS 44 (1954)? Holleaux has crafted his widely accepted 
hypothesis based on conjecture. When the sources and Roman actions are 
examined, the pact theory does not hold up.
51. Chester G. Starr, Jr., “Rhodes and Pergamum, 201-200 B.C.,” CP 33 (1938). 
Neither Rhodes nor Pergamum had been Roman allies, so Rome took advantage 
of the situation to get involved in Macedonia.
52. Galba played the demagogue in this situation. He wanted a chance to capture 
some gloria. Though Philip did not have the resources or the aim to invade Italy, 
it does not mean the Roman people believed that. They had just lived through 
sixteen years of war and conjuring up old ghosts right after Hannibal’s defeat was 
a shrewd political maneuver.
53. T. A. Dorsey, “Contributory Causes of the Second Macedonian War ” AJP 80 
(1959): 292; McDonald and WTaibank, 206.
33
CHAPTER ONE
Before scrutinizing the career of Flamininus, the competitive political atmosphere 
and the new political opportunities brought about in the aftermath of the Hannibalic War 
for ambitious nobiles will be examined first. After seventeen years of conflict many of 
the old traditions that had governed Republican politics before the hostilities changed 
because of the devastation the war had caused. Out of this, the young, but newly 
anointed Africanus emerged as the paramount Roman. The newly transformed political 
climate imparted to him the chance for success, and he converted that possibility into a 
consulship, victory over Hannibal, and the position of senatus princeps. Flamininus 
stood among a crowd of young, ambitious men who aspired to reach the consulship when 
Scipio emerged as an archetype of success. Observing the circumstances of Scipio’s 
exploits and the accolades he had won Flamininus took Africanus as a model to emulate.
Scipio provides a relevant role model to Flamininus for several reasons. Scipio 
took liberties in self-aggrandizement by allowing the Spanish to mint coins bearing his 
imase and consenting to have them call him imnerator. Flamininus would later mimic
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both of these actions, in Greece. Next, both men served extended proconsular terms in 
which the Senate gave them license to decide the fate of their provinces and their 
settlements’ impacts on the future of Rome. During their lengthy overseas appointments, 
both had to fight off challenges from invidious competitors to retain their posts. Finally, 
as contemporaries, Flamininus saw what could, and could not, be accomplished in the 
present by observing Scipio.
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The two men had almost parallel careers, which will be examined here and in 
ensuing chapters. Both men rose to the consulship at a young age, if through different 
circumstances. Each of them fought a war on foreign soil and dictated the settlements. 
Both sought and became, for a time, the greatest men in Rome and followed this up by 
holding the censorship. The quest for gloria and auctoritas motivated each man’s 
ascension.
Little evidence remains concerning the early life of Flamininus. Bom circa 229 or 
228, Flamininus belonged to the patrician gens Quinctii, and sureiy received an upper- 
class education, as well as the requisite military training and service to which all young 
men from his social station were subject.1 At the approximate age of 12, however, the 
Hannibalic War broke out and Flamininus grew up in the newly transformed competitive 
world of Roman politics. The great loss of life inflicted upon the Romans by Hannibal 
and his armies at the battles of Trebia, Trasimene, Cannae and subsequent campaigns 
drained the manpower pool from which the Roman state drew its leaders.2 Thus, two 
thines resulted from the decimation of the older nobilitv: vouneer. inexoerienced men 
could receive promotions to high offices they would normally have had to wait many 
years to achieve, and the political maneuvering between members of the aristocracy 
entered a more vicious dimension.
The actual machinery of Roman politics is not a clear-cut issue among scholars.
H. H. Scullard argued that the nobility controlled policy in the Republic by dominating 
elections and religious offices. This nobility was divided into family groups, who in turn 
contrived to determine the direction the Roman state would take. Through intermarriage
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and obligation, several gentes joined together to form parties in order to make themselves 
more difficult to defeat in elections or policy decisions. Although at times, matters of 
concern for the state or the overriding will of the people limited the power of the gentes, 
in general these families dominated the political scene until the time of the Gracchii.3 
Before going on, it is important to briefly address this theory about political factions.
P. A. Brunt argues convincingly that no hard evidence exists to corroborate 
Scullard’s theory'. Brunt proved that these “factions” lacked long term stability, forming 
and dissolving depending upon circumstances.4 Scuiiard had suggested kinship bonds as 
the glue that maintained factions over long periods of time, however, many families 
intermarried, and obligations could thus be owed to opposing groups. Further, Brunt 
explained that kinship and friendship ties were not the foremost catalysts of motivation 
for politicians. More often than not, personal advantage -  the pursuit of auctoritas - 
prompted men to act with one faction or another, or to change sides along the way.5 
Large, long-term coalitions attempting to control the Roman political scene simply did 
not exist at this time. Instead, men joined together for numerous reasons, primarily 
personal advantage. Factions coalesced, merged, disintegrated and remerged across the 
Roman political scene. Once again, the competition to become preeminent drove 
relationships among the Romans. This environment educated Flamininus to look for 
opportunities whenever they appeared.
The struggle with the Carthaginians took an enormous toll on the manpower of 
Rome. As a result, the Senate and the people constantly searched for the right men to
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bring an end to a war. The patres did not limit the hunt, but looked for almost anyone 
who could bring victory.
The significance of the situation was not lost on older men like Fabius Maximus 
and Marcellus, who had held the consulship on several occasions during the war before 
their deaths.6 The Senate even recalled the condemned, as they appointed Marcus Livius 
Salinator consul in 207 (Livy 27.34). Experienced men, however, were not the only ones 
who benefited from the situation. Glory-hungry youths also recognized that possible 
opportunities existed to quickly climb or even jump rungs in the cursus honorum to reach 
the consulship without paying the usual dues. Gneaus Fulvius Centumalus had only been 
praetor in 213 before becoming consul in 211 (Livy 25.41.8-13). Sulpicius Galba, who 
would later lead the legions against Philip in 200, also became consul in 211, but without 
holding any previous curule offices (Livy 25.41.8-13). Lucius Cornelius Lentulus held 
the consulship in 199 without having been a praetor (Livy 31.49.8-12). Scipio’s own 
colleague, Publius Licinius Crassus was only 30 when he was elected (Livy 27.6.17).
Now. eiven the rieht circumstances, even a voune man could command armies and holdy ^  O '  > *  K S
imperium. Flamininus later found himself using this new environment to elevate his
career, but he was not the first. The most relevant example is Scipio Africanus.
Scipio had survived the Roman defeat at the Battle of Cannae and had reached the 
office of aedile in 213, at the age of 21 (Livy 25.2.3-6). This popular young man was 
essentially following the normal career path of the cursus honorum (although young and 
having never served as a quaestor). Actions in Spain changed his fortunes. In 211, his 
uncle and father, Gnaeus and Publius Scipio respectively, died in combat against the
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Spanish, which left the recently acquired stronghold in southern Spain in grave danger 
(Livy 25.34-36). The Senate dispatched Gaius Claudius Nero to take the fallen Scipios1 
place. However, the people elected young Scipio, invested with proconsular imperium, to 
replace Nero (Livy 26.17.1 -18).
Livy’s account portrays the Roman people overwhelmed by emotion, which 
caused them to support the son and nephew of the fallen commanders in taking his 
vengeance. Scipio may have been given the post for the reason described by Livy, but 
other factors likely figured into his promotion: a shortage of experienced leaders, the fact 
that he was a more offensive-minded campaigner, and a promising record of previous 
military service. The Senate wanted someone they could trust to command effectively, 
not just a sentimental favorite. Scipio had some proven military skill and this garnered 
him the Spanish command as the first private citizen to hold imperium without attaining 
the magistracies of praetor or consul. Scipio provided an example for other men who 
craved auctoritas. The Hannibalic War had begun to transform the political climate in 
Rome. Desperation for leaders of any promise pushed the people to elect little-known 
men in hopes that their youth and energy would end the war.
Scipio proved to be a man of nearly unmaichable military prowess. He took New 
Carthage in 209, then continued his success by defeating Hasdrubal Barca at Baecula in 
208, and Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, at Ilipa in 206 / With the Carthaginian forces 
defeated, Scipio secured Spain and, in 205, he returned to Rome to stand for the office of 
consul. The young conqueror provoked some jealousy, especially after a Saguntinc 
embassy told the Senate of his exploits and their desire to call him king. Scipio had told
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them to refer to him as imperator instead. No one had taken this title previously. 
Nevertheless, Scipio enjoyed immense popularity and the comitia centuriata 
unanimously voted him consul.
The Senate assigned him the province of Sicily, and Scipio’s grand strategy began 
to unfold as he planned the crossing into Africa. The invidia of some senatorial members 
had not ceased and his fitness as consul became a topic of investigation. Yet when the 
commission came to Sicily and saw the magnitude and Quality of his preparations, they 
dropped the allegations. Next, he traversed over to Africa and held proconsular power 
from 204 to 201, until the defeat of Hannibal at Zama and the subsequent settlement of 
the war. After his victory over Hannibal, Scipio formulated all of the conditions of the 
peace, to which the Senate whole-heartedly agreed. Scipio concluded all of the affairs in 
Africa and returned to Rome to celebrate a grand triumph.
During this time Scipio fell prey to many attacks from invidia. In 202 just before 
Zama, the new consul Tiberius Claudius Nero had received a share of the African 
command after persuading the Senate. This act represented an attack on Scipio as Nero 
tried to steal some of his gloria, thus diminishing Scipio’s accomplishment. Nero, 
however, never reached Africa because a storm destroyed his fleet. Again in 201, invidia 
took part as the newly elected consuls -  Publius Aelius Paetus and Gnaeus Cornelius 
Lentulus - attempted to replace Africanus, in order to steal away the settlement with the 
Carthaginians. After the interference of the tribunes, a compromise by the senate gave 
imperium to Scipio on land and imperium to Lentulus at sea (Livy 30.40.9-16)
39
After the Hannibalic War, Scipio settled down to a political role, with brief 
military interludes during his consulship in 194, and later serving as the legate to his
brother Lucius in the War against Antiochus. Though little evidence remains, much
/
speculation exists concerning the influence that Scipio exerted on the Roman state until 
his downfall in 183. Several examples, however, can be given to demonstrate Scipio’s 
sway.
Within two years o f his return from Africa, Scipio rode his wave of popularity 
into the censorship and the titie of senatus princeps (Livy 32.7.1-3). Never before had a 
man so young achieved so high an honor. But invidia abounded throughout the Senate 
and for a time, his influence waned, though in terms of dignitas and auctoritas, no one 
else in Rome came close. In 200, Africanus was not even considered for the command in 
Macedonia as most feared that the defeat of Philip at his hands would give him the power 
to make changes in the state.9
Though “factions” or “groups” changed and mixed, Scipio had definite designs 
for Roman nolicv and he necessarilv kept a laree s t o u d  of sunoorters around him. Hex y y  x  w  w  1  x x
clearly affected elections, since friends and relatives held praetorships and consulships 
year after year, in order to continue his influence in policy decisions.10 In addition, he 
gained for his brother Lucius the province of Greece, so that he might face the threat of 
Antiochus. Scipio achieved this for Lucius because he promised the people he would 
serve as legate (and it increased his own auctoritas). The people voted the province to 
the Scipios unanimously (Livy 37.1.7-10). Finally, if the anecdote can be believed, 
Scipio used his prestige to save his brother Lucius from accusations of embezzlement.
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He tore apart the account books of the Asian campaign in front of the Senate. Then, he 
delivered a speech about the 2,500 talents from the war deposited into the treasury and 
the services he had rendered to his country versus the 500 talents his brother had 
supposedly taken (Livy 38.35). Although his actions only postponed further accusations, 
they demonstrated the power he wielded.
Africanus had saved his brother, but only for a time. The show of auctoritas had 
opened Scipio to accusations and his long time enemy, Cato the Elder, soon pressed the 
attack. Without going into detail, Cato accused Scipio of entering into treasonous 
negotiations with the Seleucid king Antiochus. The onslaught proved too strong to 
withstand, but Scipio extradited himself from conviction by reminding the people of his 
past services. However, his political life had been terminated and he retired to Litemum 
where he died in 183.11
The preceding has been a brief encapsulation of the actions of Scipio. Several 
times in his career, Scipio had challenged the limitations of wielding power. Examples 
include trying to gain Macedonia as a province in 194; using his name to save his brother; 
negotiating privately with Antiochus as a legate with no imperium, then saving himself 
with his own name. These examples serve as comparative material for the career of 
Flamininus. The actions of Flamininus were not unique, but he had a model in Scipio, 
who used his auctoritas to reach for greatness, resulting in a backlash against him by his 
fellows.
Scipio’s ambition to be great provides a splendid illustration of the connection 
between imperialism and aristocratic competition. The desire, and in truth, the necessity
41
to achieve more to stay at the top forced men like Scipio to expand Roman authority. 
Their competitive nature infected the senate as well, as all were nobiles. So Rome 
pushed her influence further, until the necessity of being greater forced a man to begin to 
step outside the boundaries of lawful authority. The new overseas commands contributed 
to this by stationing a man far from his patres and leaving him to make decisions alone. 
Though he may have had experienced legates, they had no imperium to force the 
commander not to act.
Parallels can be seen in the careers of Flamininus as he served as a military 
tribune under Marcellus in 208 (Plut. Flam. 1.3-4). By 206, he had likely held the 
magistracy of quaestor and served under his uncle at Tarentum. His uncle died in 206 or
205, and due to a lack of commanders, Flamininus took over the position of governor
• 10 with propraetorian imperium. Once again, because of a manpower shortage, Flamininus
1 3continued at this post until 202 in possession of full imperium. For up to four years, 
Flamininus enjoyed the experience of total control, a position that fell to him at the age of 
twenty-five, after only a quaestorship, which was not even a curule magistracy. 
Normally, men had to go through a series o f offices, each with an increasingly greater 
measure of prestige and power. Only older men who had acquired a large degree of 
dignitas and experience were traditionally eligible for magistracies invested with 
imperium. l4 As a naturally ambitious young man15, Flamininus must have seen new 
possibilities with the ascension of Scipio, his senior by only a few years.
At the age of 25 Scipio had held imperium, and at 30, had become consul without 
holding an office higher than the aedileship. Many Romans probably viewed Scipio’s
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circumstances as a fluke of the war, or as divine providence.16 Scipio had reached the 
pinnacle of achievement, but others had found a way around the system as well. For 
example, Licinius Crassus had held the consulship in 205 with Scipio, and was the same 
age. In addition, Crassus had become Pontifex Maximus in 212 at the age of 23, and in 
210, had become censor without ever having been consul (Livy 27.6.17). As has already 
been stated, the great losses brought upon Rome by the Carthaginians forced changes and 
exceptions to be made in political and military appointments, in order to fight the war 
effectively. Men like Crassus and Scipio benefited from these conditions.
Flamininus found his career profiting from the wartime circumstances as well. 
He had only held the lowest of offices, and yet went on to hold authority over a major 
city, even exercising imperium. Surely Flamininus saw the possibilities and what the 
future might hold for him. Why not try to rise to the top quickly? At this point, the only 
consequences for those who had done so appeared to be glory and renown.
Plutarch cites Flamininus as being an extraordinary administrator and military 
commander (Plut. Flam. 1.3-4). After the Hannibalic War had concluded, the Senate 
chose Flamininus -  due to his previous good service -  as one member of two separate 
commissions delegated to settle colonists and soldiers. First, he served on a ten-man 
commission assigned to settle Scipio’s veterans in southern ltaiy. Next, he led a three- 
man commission, with Gaius Varro and Publius Cornelius Scipio being his juniors, to 
settle people in the area of Venusia, as well as in the cities of Namia and Cossa (Plut. 
Flam. 1.4; Livy 31.49.5-6).
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Plutarch said that these prestigious assignments inspired him to reach for greater 
places, despite his lack of normal prerequisite offices {Flam. 2.1). Plutarch evaluated 
Flamininus correctly for the most part, but these land commission assignments just made 
him more eager to try for the consulship. Actually, Flamininus had experienced first 
hand the changes in Roman policy concerning magistracies. He knew a competent man 
did not have to follow the normal path to become a great man; a little experience, the 
right circumstances, and luck might make him another Scipio Afficanus.
Flamininus stood for the consulship in the year 198. The Second Macedonian 
War had been going on since 200. Little, however, had been accomplished by either 
Galba in 200 or by Villius in 199. Flamininus’ candidacy provoked two tribunes, Marcus 
Fulvius and Manius Curius, to threaten to veto his application to the office. They 
asserted that Flamininus lacked the qualifications to be a consul: he was too young, had 
not held any curule offices, and was denigrating the cursus honorum itself. A debate 
ensued in the comitia centuriata, and when referred back to the senators, they decided to 
have the people vote on the matter. Manius and Marcus agreed to stand down and await 
the verdict of the people. The people returned the 29-year-old Flamininus as consul 
(Livy 32.7.8-13; Plut. Flam. 2).
A major point of dissension among scholars remains whether the Senate gave the 
province of Macedonia to Flamininus, or if he simply drew it by lot. The theory 
promulgated by both Badian and Scullard holds that the Senate handpicked Flamininus to 
succeed Villius in Macedonia. This interpretation of Flamininus posits that he held a 
large degree of diplomatic expertise concerning Hellas and that the majority of the Senate
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knew about it, but the fact that the Senate did not appoint him any earlier and, more 
importantly, that little evidence remains to support this conclusion discredits their 
argument. The reasoning behind this hypothesis, however, is that the war was not going 
as the Senate had planned. Both Villius, and Galba before him, had proven unable to 
establish a believable propaganda campaign with the Greek allies or the Macedonian 
people. At the outset of the war, a council of the Aetolians met to determine whether to 
continue their treaty with Philip or to join in the effort against him. Galba sent Lucius 
Furius Purpurio to argue the case of the Romans. He failed to convince the Aetolians, 
who let the matter hang in the balance, obviously waiting for more decisive action to 
determine which side to join (Livy 31.31-32). Galba had been especially harsh in his
17treatment of the defeated, using terror to gain results, but this tactic had failed. 
Flamininus had spent four years in Tarentum, a mostly Greek city, learning and dealing 
with the Greek mindset. He had proven to be an excellent governor, and Rome needed
1 Rsomeone with diplomatic skills to keep the Greeks on their side against Philip.
In the field, neither Galba nor Villius had proven overly successful. At both 
Athacus and Ottolobum, Galba had experienced mild success against Philip, but none of 
the results proved decisive (Livy 31.34.5-37). Villius never even had a chance to engage 
Philip before the arrival of Flamininus (Livy 32.6.5-7). Plutarch claimed Flamininus had 
great military skills in addition to his political ones, all the more reason for him to replace 
Villius.
Livy (32.8.4) and Plutarch (Flam. 2.2) both wrote that Flamininus and Pactus 
drew lots, and Flamininus ended up with Macedonia. However, Badian and others assert
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instead that Flamininus was “selected” to take the position in Macedonia. Paetus had no
i
military experience or experience with Greeks, and obviously lacked the qualities 
necessary to lead a successful campaign against Philip. Badian argues that Galba, an 
“Eastern expert,” received Macedonia in the same way in 199.19 Livy and Plutarch both 
mentioned the drawing of lots, even though the Senate had offered the two an opportunity 
to decide the matter between themselves. Badian takes the argument a step further by 
citing the practice of false allotment; the ceremony was fixed so Flamininus would win. 
He says the ceremony was held to gain the sanction of the gods instead of simply having 
the two candidates choose their provinces.20
Arthur Eckstein argues against this commonly held view that Flamininus had the 
Macedonian command handed to him. He cites several examples where less qualified 
men succeeded to a command by lot against a more qualified candidate. Little evidence 
exists that demonstrates any fixing of allotments for the more qualified took place. The 
evidence that does remain for fixing lots comes from the time of Cicero, and is thus 
late 21 In addition, though Philip had proven to be a proficient and wily opponent, he did 
not represent the same kind of threat as Hannibal, or even the Gauls. The Macedonian 
war had merely stalled. No invasion from the East seemed imminent, and there had been 
no great loss of Roman life.
Eckstein rightly notes that the tribunes objected to Flamininus’ candidature 
because he was not a proven man. When Africanus had stood for the consulship, he had 
defeated the best Carthaginian generals on several occasions, managed an army, and 
conducted affairs in the province of Spain. Flamininus had only been a garrison
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commander. Plutarch said that Flamininus had shown great skill as a military 
commander, but no details exist. Certainly, if Flamininus had done something 
extraordinary, Livy would not have failed to note it. It seems likely that he did not have 
any experience commanding an army in the field or taking part in any large battles as a 
general before crossing over to face Philip. There is not much reason why he would be 
preferred to Paetus, as all Roman men go through military training. Knowledge of the 
military’ system and how to command were available to all. He would not have been in 
the field alone, but would have been accompanied by experienced legates to advise him.
Most importantly, the two men rejected the chance to decide the division of the 
provinces between themselves (Livy 32.8.1-4). Competition is the reason. Though not 
as militarily experienced as Flamininus, Paetus surely foresaw the prospect to become the 
man who won the Second Macedonian War. Others had failed to defeat Philip in a 
decisive manner, and only gloria could ensue from a victory over the Macedonians. 
Allowing Flamininus to go would only damage Paetus’ position in Roman society, 
whereas not choosing the correct lot simply meant that the gods had favored Flamininus 
on this occasion.
Once the province of Macedonia had fallen to Flamininus, he made preparations 
for taking charge of the campaign. Intelligently, Flamininus levied the 3,000 Roman 
infantrymen allotted to him by the Senate from the veterans of Scipio Africanus (Plut. 
Flam. 3.3; Livy 32.8.1-3). Eventually Scipio and Flamininus would become rivals during 
Flamininus’ service in the East, but scholars have attempted to define their relationship 
prior to Flamininus’ success, to explain the use of Scipio’s veterans.
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Richard Haywood portrays them as friends and claimed that Flamininus’ election 
came about largely due to the support of Scipio, the main link between them being their 
philhellenism. Haywood also cites Flamininus as a member of the Scipionic veteran 
settlement commissions (Plut. Flam. 1.4; Livy 31.49.5-6) and sees his drafting of 
Scipionic veterans for his upcoming campaign (Plut. Flam. 3.3; Livy 32.8.1-3) as support 
for their friendship.23 Scullard does not go so far as Haywood, but does view Scipio as a 
possible supporter or at least, as friendly towards Flamininus. He, too, cites the 
manpower recruitment as evidence, and sees philhellenism as common ground between 
them, but he finds them approaching it in different ways.24 Badian finds no definite 
connection between them; they were neither friends nor enemies, though Badian agrees 
with Scullard in terms of the Scipio allowing Flamininus to recruit his veterans. A. H. 
McDonald differs from the others seeing them as rivals. He finds no evidence to support 
Scipionic aid in the election of Flamininus or any subsequent actions.
All of these historians bring out good arguments, but Badian seems most 
convincing. As has been mentioned previously, Scipio possessed too much auctoritas 
and inspired too much invidia to gamer him the appointment in the East. Flamininus was 
largely an unknown quality, and a victory over Philip was uncertain at best. Flamininus 
was about eight years younger than Scipio, and the possibility exists of Flamininus being
■yn
related to the Fabii, a gens that had feuded with the Scipios at times, which would 
preclude the likelihood of any strong, friendly association between them. Philhellenism 
guaranteed nothing; similar cultural appreciation does not have to include close political 
ties. So Scipio and Flamininus held neither friendship nor enmity toward one another.
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The source evidence, however, centers on the drafting of Spanish and African 
veterans by Flamininus. Examining this problem logically, it only makes sense that 
Flamininus would recruit the victors of many a Carthaginian battle. The goal, after all, 
was to win the war. Scipio could not have refused him. Villius had already commanded 
2,000 Scipionic veterans in Macedonia, and he cannot be numbered among the supporters 
of Scipio. The veterans themselves must be considered as well. The Hanmbalic War 
had decimated large tracts of farmland, leaving some veterans without a stable livelihood. 
The chance to take up the gladius and scutum offered them regular pay and the chance for 
booty. Others simply remained soldiers and were looking for a new campaign. Scipio 
would only have damaged his reputation among his former soldiers by trying to prevent 
them from enlisting with Flamininus. Individual loyalty to commanders had always 
existed, but the transference of allegiance from Rome to the general belongs to the
90Marian reforms almost a hundred years later. Flamininus recruited from the Scipionic 
veterans because they were the best warriors available and he wanted a strong core in his 
forces.
For a time, bad omens detained Flamininus and Paetus in Rome until they had 
performed the necessary rituals to placate the gods (Livy 32.9). The problem of 
Flamininus dealing with religious rites before crossing over to Macedonia will be dealt 
with in the material concerning his prorogation in 198.
Flamininus had taken into account the history of the proceeding consuls of 
Macedonia, and determined that they had squandered valuable time in Rome instead of 
rushing over to prosecute the war. Flamininus relinquished the normal privileges and
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honors due to a newly elected consul so as to reach Macedonia with more time to face the 
Macedonians (Plut. Flam. 3.4). With 8,000 infantry and 800 cavalry, Flamininus crossed 
over to Brundisium and moved inland, relieving Villius earlier than expected (Livy 
32.9.6-8; Plut. Flam. 3.4).
The early careers of Scipio and Flamininus provide an important study of the 
effects the Flannibalic War had on Roman politics. Ambition was a requisite trait for the 
mobiles to possess if they wanted to advance up the cursus honorum, but men like Scipio 
and Flamininus had an excess of it. The massive devastation of the Flannibalic War, in 
conjunction with the fact that traditions, such as age requirements to hold certain offices, 
lacked strict guidelines allowed for both men to “bend the rules” and rapidly ascend the 
cursus honorum. The deaths of veteran officers provided unexpected commands for both 
men and allowed them to take up a positions of authority unusual for young men. Each 
situation gave them confidence and valuable experience, which supplied an edge in the 
diminished field of competitors contending for the consulship. The Flannibalic War had 
made the boundaries to political power more permeable than before, thus allowing a 
variety of men previously considered ineligible to cross them. The similarities between 
Scipio and Flamininus continued beyond their early careers and will be noted in the 
following chapters.
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CHAPTER TWO
After arriving in the Greek World in 198, Flamininus would remain there until 
194 before returning to Rome and in those five years, he distinguished himself like no 
other of his era, with the exception of Scipio himself. Flamininus’ aspiration for gloria 
influenced the military and political strategies he utilized to win the war. He consistently 
toiled to affect a martial solution for the conflict. His focus on reaping a decisive victory 
in the field gives testimony to his being a product of the militant culture of the nobilitas. 
He did not endeavor to settle the campaign peacefully because he feared losing the 
accolades of war and power. When necessary, though, he openly employed diplomacy to 
retain his command and insure Greek support, or at least, to keep the Hellenes inactive. 
He worked as both an agent of imperialism while exploring the limits of his personal 
authority.
After taking command of the Roman forces at the Aous River, Flamininus did not 
wish to waste time, but intended to force Philip into a pitched battle. Flamininus knew 
that the only way to become a truly great man would require him to defeat the 
Macedonians decisively in the field. But he faced an enemy defensively situated in 
formidable terrain.
Prior to the arrival of Flamininus, Philip had begun to feel the winds of change 
blowing against him. The Aetolians and Achaeans were waffling as remaining allies, and 
he feared his own Macedonians might turn against him if things did not improve. Philip 
decided to prevent the Romans from entering Macedonia by garrisoning the passes into 
his kingdom. Reconnoitering the area, he decided upon a site near the Aous River as the
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best spot to set up a headquarters (Livy 32.5.1-10). The Aous flowed fast through a 
narrow gorge between high mountains on either side of the river (Livy 32.5.11; Plut. 
Flam. 3.4-5), and the Macedonians took up positions in the foothills to both sides of the 
defile. Only a small detachment stood guard where the topography proved especially 
difficult to pass, but in the more accessible locations, the soldiers constructed defensive 
works and assembled artillery (Livy 32.5.12-13).
The previous consul, Villius, had accomplished nothing against Philip’s 
fortifications, and Flamininus eagerly called a council to determine the best way to force 
Philip into battle. Filled with eagerness and driven by ambition, Flamininus unwisely 
decided to attack Philip where he had dug in.1 He tried on several occasions to dislodge 
the Macedonians from their positions, but only succeeded in racking up the casualty 
count. The Macedonians held a virtually impregnable spot against frontal assaults. 
After forty days without progress (Livy 32.10.1), Philip, under pressure of an Epirote 
embassy, contacted the Romans to set up a peace conference.
Flamininus met with Philip to discuss the terms of the peace, and demanded that 
the Macedonians remove garrisons from cities, restore recoverable property7 to people of 
the areas he had devastated and then be evaluated by a selected board. Philip replied that 
cities he had captured would be released, but some of the cities belonged to Macedonia 
because of hereditary and legal possession and were not subject to the consul’s demands. 
Philip agreed to arbitration for unrecoverable property, but only by states friendly to both 
Macedonia and Rome (Livy 32.10.1-5; Diod. 28.9.11). Flamininus answered that no 
arbiters were necessary and that Philip was obviously guilty of aggression in the conflict.
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He declared Thessaly, a region under Macedonian control since the fourth century, 
should be the first state freed from Philip’s sway. Incensed at Flamininus’ demand, 
Philip dissolved the council (Livy 32.10.6=8; Diod. 28.9.11).
At a first look, Flamininus seemed to have failed where a possible compromise 
may have been made, but peace had never been the consul’s intention. He essentially 
offered Philip a rerum repetitio, a quasi-legal device in which the enemy was offered 
terms that they would never agree to fulfill. Flamininus gave terms to Philip that he 
knew the king would not agree to because of their harshness and the strong position 
Philip held at that point in the conflict. Although much has been made of the Aous 
Declaration, Flamininus -  whether he had some type of instructions from the Senate or 
not -  intentionally sabotaged the summit in order to return the conflict to the field.4 The 
Senate would not have granted a triumph to Flamininus for a peace treaty with Macedon. 
Time still remained to find a military solution to the Second Macedonian War, and 
Flamininus refused to give in so easily. He wanted a victory on the battlefield, not at the 
conference table.
More attempts to extricate the Macedonians failed, but fortune -  and allies -  
saved Flamininus from his folly (Livy 32.10.9-12). An Epirote named Charopus sent a 
local shepherd to Flamininus; the man knew a trail that could lead a Roman force behind 
the Macedonians (Livy 32.11.1-3; Plut. Flam. 4.3). Though the shepherd was an 
unknown quantity who might possibly lead the Romans into a trap, Flamininus saw the 
opportunity to solve the puzzle of Philip’s position. By circumventing the Macedonian 
pickets and using a surprise attack, Flamininus envisaged the decisive battle he longed to
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fight. Without victory, Flamininus could not sate his ambition, and so decided to take the 
risk.
Flamininus led assaults against the Macedonian fortifications for two days as a 
feint. Then, he had a military tribune take 4,000 infantry and 300 cavalry along the secret 
pathway by night. As a precaution, he shackled the shepherd. Flamininus waited for two 
days and then, on the third, he attacked (Livy 32.1-12.1; Plut. Flam. 4.3-4).
The consul brought up his army, divided it into three columns and sent them 
against the Macedonian ramparts. The Macedonians answered and sent their forces out 
to meet the Romans. As the battle raged, the Romans slowly pushed the Macedonians 
back up to their defensive works, but in doing this, they found themselves in a dangerous 
situation. Philip’s troops began to rally. At this point the hidden Roman detachment 
gave their smoke signal, which at first appeared to be only the morning mist of the 
mountains until it thickened and darkened. The hard-pressed Romans revived themselves 
and counterattacked with great vigor. Then a shout from the height came down, and the 
second Roman force assaulted the Macedonians from the rear. A rout ensued as the 
Macedonian soldiers broke formation to flee. The rough terrain prevented the Roman 
cavalry from pursuing and allowed the majority of the enemy, including Philip, to escape. 
The Macedonian casualties stood at 2,000. No ancient source provides a figure for the 
Roman side.*
Flamininus had taken a large risk in sending the detachment into the hills hoping 
that they would be in position to turn the battle for the Roman side. Yet, the consul knew 
that he had a limited amount of time to force Philip into battle. Unfortunately, the Battle
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of Aous River did not become the decisive battle that Flamininus had anticipated. 
Topography proved to be the consul’s undoing.
Philip fled into Thessaly and burned many towns along the way to keep their 
supplies out of Roman hands (Livy 32.13.1-9). Yet the Macedonian king had more 
problems as the Aetolians and the Athamanes had begun to capture areas in Thessaly, 
since they assumed Philip was too occupied with the Romans to march against them 
(Livy 32.13.10-15). Flamininus took advantage of these new' players on the scene by 
detaching some troops to help the Athamanes storm, and finally take, the vitally situated 
fort of Gomphi in Thessaly (Livy 32.14.1-3).
The Roman failure to end the war at the Aous River, and Philip’s subsequent 
escape, left Flamininus little choice but to start considering other options in case he did 
not succeed in bringing the Macedonians to battle again. Some think that Flamininus’ 
diplomatic skills were a strong reason for his gaining the consulship in the first place, but 
negotiating in war differed greatly from daily governing in Tarentum. The sources give 
no specifics about Flamininus’ actions as a diplomat or general in southern Italy.6 
Certainly, he had never commanded an army before, and now found many obstacles 
before him.
Although his foremost priority was to defeat Philip in a decisive battle, 
Flamininus understood that with the campaigning season growing short, he might need to 
resort to diplomatic means to conclude the war. Signing a treaty with Philip before the 
new consuls took office would be prestigious, possibly even gain him an ovatio.1 That 
would be better than simply chasing after Philip and accomplishing nothing. But
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Flamininus yearned for gloria and auctoritas, and he knew that he had only this one 
chance to win the war, or the Senate would appoint someone else to do it instead.
He had to pursue Philip, but first he needed to secure his rear and establish safe 
supply lines. Flamininus marched into Epirus as he chased after Philip, and he knew this 
region would become his rear flank as the hunt continued. Subduing the area might take 
months that Flamininus did not have to waste, so he ordered his troops to refrain from 
plundering in order to gain Epirote confidence, and after he entered the country, the
Q
Epirotes hurriedly fulfilled his requests and obeyed orders. Flamininus tactfully 
negotiated with them, procuring both their allegiance and some auxiliary troops as well 
(Livy 32.15.4-8). This took little time, and soon the Romans set out after Philip by the 
route previously protected at Gomphi.9
The genesis of Flamininus the philhellene is often associated with this crossroads 
in his career, but this is a modem scholarly construct, ill supported by the evidence. In 
this older view he is seen as an excellent diplomat whose love of Greek culture allowed 
him to finish the war and free the Greeks from the tyrannical designs of Philip, however, 
Flamininus dealt with the Greeks too meekly, and this led to the future problems between 
Greece and Rome.10 Yet this antiquated model of Flamininus’ motives fails under close 
scrutiny. As both Badian and Gruen have noted, Flamininus did not fit this early modem 
perception. 11
Flamininus did speak Greek (Polyb. 18.1, 18.4-9, 18.36-37; Plut. Flam. 5.5, 6.1- 
3), though Badian debated his actual fluency,12 and he had spent time in Taientuin 
governing a Greek population where he became exposed first hand to their culture. He
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jested with Philip and other Greeks during his time in Hellas. Yet, the sources reveal no 
evidence that he was enamored with philosophy, art, theater or anything else culturally 
Greek. Language can be a useful tool and does not necessitate a love of the culture. In 
Plutarch’s Lives {Flam. 12.5-8), Flamininus inscribed some silver bucklers at Delphi and 
a golden wreath to Apollo to show his appreciation of liberating Greece, yet the 
inscriptions themselves focus on the gift-giver -  Flamininus -  more than the gift itself. In 
the dedication to Apollo, Flamininus identifies himself as “great leader of the children of 
Aeneas” and “god-like.” Nothing shows an appreciation for Greek culture. (These 
words ring of Hellenistic propaganda.)
Occasions occurred when he showed himself to be as cruel as Galba: the 
decimation of Phaloria (Livy 32.15.2-4), the sack of Eiatia (Livy 32.24) and the 
plundering of a golden statue of Zeus for display in Rome (Cic. Verr. 2.4.129). These 
provide excellent examples of Flamininus’ “sentimentalism.” In negotiations with Philip, 
Flamininus readily offered terms against the wishes of the Greeks, all for the betterment 
of Rome and himself (Livy 32.35; Polyb. 18.8). Flamininus only worried about 
satisfying the concerns of the Greeks when those concerns influenced his plans, not 
because of some special appreciation for them.
Truly, Flamininus was a typical example of Roman aristocracy and a vector for 
Roman imperialism. He had immense ambition, and he wanted renown and power in 
Rome; being “sentimental” for the concerns of the Greeks would not get him these 
things. Gruen puts it well, “The divide stood not only between individual inclination and
n # #
collective policy, but between sentiment and behavior”. Even if Flamininus had
60
admired Greek culture (and there is no evidence in the sources for it), that admiration 
could not be allowed to get in the way of his ambitions. Nor would the Senate or the 
Roman people permit a consul to follow a policy that did not favor perceived Roman 
interests,14 even if Flamininus would have desired to do so. Philhellenism existed in 
Rome, but it only included a small group of the upper class. Other senators and equites -  
not to mention the average Roman -  derided Hellenism as weak, alien, and morally 
corrupt. Cato openly attacked the invasion of Greek culture into Rome,15 and in 186, the 
Senate outlawed the Bacchanalian cult because they viewed it as subversive.16 
Philhellenism may have been practiced, but it was far from a popular movement. Roman 
philhellenes had to be careful not to display their fondness for things Greek too 
prominently, or else risk harming their dignitas.11
Some evidence does exist that might portray Flamininus as a philhellene: he 
composed inscriptions in Greek, conversed and joked with Philip and the allies in their 
own tongue, and kept art treasures he captured in war. Whether this actually proves he 
was a philhellene or not matters little as his actions throughout his command in Greece 
point to a man serving the imperialistic ambitions of himself and his own country. At no 
time did Flamininus trade Roman interests for Greek.
As Flamininus entered Thessaly, he did not engage in diplomacy to settle matters 
as he had in Epirus. He had time yet, and so opted for battle instead. Laying siege to 
Phaloria, he destroyed it, and this example caused other Thessalian towns to surrender, 
creating a secure supply line from the Ambracian Gulf to the pass at Gomphi (Livy 
32.15.5-9). Next, he moved on to Atrax.
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As Eckstein has shown, and the evidence makes clear, Flamininus still pursued
1 0  t
his goal with force, not politics. It is true that he had used diplomacy to settle Epirus, 
but in that case time had become a factor. In addition, Epirus had poor grain production, 
and thus did not represent a good source of food. Although they held a pro-Macedonian 
stance, they remained officially neutral. Rome tended to handle neutral states by 
diplomatic means rather than military ones.19 As he laid siege to Atrax, Flamininus 
remained bent on securing a decisive victory on the battlefield in pursuit of gloria.
Atrax proved to be too big an obstacle for Flamininus to handle, however. 
Repeatedly, as soon as success seemed imminent, the Macedonian garrison would rally. 
Despite being furious and ashamed at this failure, time demanded that Flamininus end the 
siege (Livy 32.17.4-18.3). The legions needed winter quarters, and because of the 
necessity of supplying them by sea, Flamininus moved south toward Anticyra in Phocis. 
Along the way he brought other poleis under Roman control, for security. Things seemed 
grim (Livy 32.18.1-9). The campaigning season was concluding and the consul was 
nowhere close to bringing the wily Macedonian king to battle. At this point, with a 
military solution fading as a probable option, Flamininus began to devise ways to achieve 
something definite before being superseded.
Though diplomacy always remained a tool for his use, and he had used it well in 
Epirus, Flamininus had otherwise gone out o f his way to bring the Second Macedonian 
War to a close with arms. This was why he had decided to forego the route through 
upper and central Macedonia, instead opting to attack Philip’s elevated and fortified 
position in the Aous Valley, and then issuing a rerum repetitio to quash any possibility of
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a peaceful settlement. He had taken a chance on finding a secret route to the rear of 
Philip’s position, and had ousted the king from his stronghold, but could not pursue him. 
He had given over Roman troops to the Athamanes to help sweep away the Macedonians, 
and had used force to bring parts of Thessaly under his control. The only time he had 
used diplomacy was in Epirus, and reasons have been given for his application of it. 
Atrax, though, showed the price of his failure at Aous. Force alone would no longer do.
Operations continued in Thessaly, as Roman legions besieged Elatia and the 
combined Roman-Rhodian and Pergammese fleet prepared to attack Corinth (Livy 
32.18.9-19.1-4). Then an opportunity presented itself that allowed Flamininus to hope 
for a second chance.
The Achaean League represented the majority of the poleis in Greece and 
Cycliades, leader of a pro-Macedonian faction, had kept the league in support of Philip. 
Now Aristaenus, the pro-Roman president of the league, had ousted Cycliades. Via 
Lucius, Flamininus hastily sent ambassadors to the Achaeans, requesting that they join 
the Romans, who in turn would reunite Corinth with the league and free them from the 
Macedonian king’s oppression. The situation was not so clean-cut for the Achaeans, 
though. Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, threatened the league with possible invasion, and 
Roman force frightened them. They might be unsure of Philip, but they owed him for 
acts of kindness. Thus, none of these options seemed attractive, but the Achaeans gave 
an audience to the Romans, Pergamenes, Rhodians, Macedonians, and Athenians at 
Sicyon. That way, they could decide what course of action to follow.
63
For an entire day the discussion raged with no outcomes but, on the second day, 
Aristaenus delivered a powerful speech that accused Philip of many things including 
failure to provide aid in 199 against Nabis as he had promised, allowing the Romans to 
attack his “allies” in Thessaly while running for home, and a series of murders at 
Messene (Livy 32.19.2-13). He continued by outlining the Romans’ position in the war 
as greatly superior to Philip’s. Rome did not need to ask for help from the Achaeans; 
they could simply take Achaea if they so wished, since she had control of the sea, as well 
as allies in the Rhodians and Pergamese. Nothing prevented them with making an 
alliance with Nabis to destroy the league entirely (Livy 32.21). The delegates reacted 
strongly to Aristaenus’ words, which caused an even five-to-five split among the council. 
Argument continued, but it resolved nothing.21
On the final day, the council proclaimed that a decision had to be reached, and it 
soon became clear that enough support existed for the Romans to win over the council. 
Pisias o f Pellene had convinced his son, Memnon, to vote pro-Roman by threatening his 
life and begging him to preserve the existence of the Achaeans (Livy 32.22.4-9). And as 
they saw the momentum of the council against them, delegates from Megalopolis and 
Dymae left the council in disgust, since Philip had aided them in the past (Livy 32.22.9- 
12). With their departure, the council swung to the Roman side and approved the alliance 
with Rome and her allies. Then the Achaeans reinforced the Roman troops at Corinth 
(Livy 32.23.1-3).
Much has been made of the Achaean League joining the Romans. Some 
historians, notably Badian and Wood, have presented the alliance as part of Flamininus’
64
policy in Greece. Besides the necessity of securing Epirus, Flamininus had not moved 
to make any alliances or form diplomatic relations with the Greeks. He wanted to end the 
war militarily, not diplomatically. However, with time against him, the consul saw that 
other means had to be put into play.
Gaining the support of the Achaeans had not been a sure thing, but when it did 
occur, Flamininus accomplished two things. First, he had a better chance to end the war, 
as Philip now had fewer followers on whom to call for help against a growing coalition of 
Roman allies, and his thoughts must have turned naturally to a settlement.23 Second, with 
the Achaean League as an ally, Flamininus had the support of the greater part of Greece 
behind him. (This eliminated the possible danger that he might have to fight on both 
northern and southern fronts.)
He continued with his military strategy in the field, but with the knowledge that it 
would be extremely difficult to bring Philip to battle before the Senate found a possible 
replacement for him. Flamininus had hoped to accomplish enough to be prorogued by 
the Senate 24 Friends and relatives had been instructed to present his case to the senate 
when the allotment of provinces for 197 took place, as he did not want to lose his chance 
at greatness while it was still within his grasp (Livy 32.32.6-9). His am id  in Rome could 
present the patres with solid evidence of his progress, which greatly exceeded that 
achieved by either Galba or Villius. He had defeated Philip decisively, although not 
conclusively, at Aous; he had befriended the Epirotes and set up a secure supply line 
from the sea; he had reduced many enemy towns by force; and he now had formed an
65
alliance with the largest and most powerful league in Greece. This new coalition gave 
him some pull in his plans for prorogation in Macedonia.
Elatia fell to Flamininus, but Philocles, Philip’s general, brought reinforcements 
to Corinth and raised the coalition’s siege. Philocles, who had learned that the people 
supported Philip, accepted an Argive offer to join the Macedonian side (Livy 32.23.4-25). 
Flamininus had made great progress in 198, but the year-end reverses put him into an 
uncertain position for the future.
Elections took place in Rome with Gaius Cornelius Cethegus and Quintus 
Minucius Rufus voted into the consulship for 197 B.C. These new consuls prepared to 
draw lots for the provinces of Italy (as there had been worrisome movements from the 
Celts) and Macedonia. Two tribunes, Lucius Opius and Quintus Fulvius, interceded with 
an objection to the drawing. The tribunes claimed that Flamininus had made great 
progress, and would have won the war by now if he had not been detained in Rome for 
months tending to sacred rites. Surely, with no shake up in command, Flamininus would 
finish the Macedonians by summertime (Livy 32.28.1-8).
This brings up an interesting problem. The tribunes had made a case for 
Flamininus’ accomplishments as a reason to keep him in command, but also claimed that 
he had spent the greater part of the year dealing with religious duties.*" Yet Livy, 
however, tells us that during the apportioning of provinces in 198, Flamininus was 
detained for only a short time as the consuls conducted one day of prayer and performed 
some sacrifices (32.9.1-5). They then hurried off to their provinces. Livy then mentions 
that Flamininus arrived to relieve Villius earlier than had been expected (Livy 32.9.1-6).
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So Livy contradicts himself between chapter 9 and chapter 28, yet the tribunes may have 
used religion as a lever against Flamininus’ replacement. He had spent time getting the 
favor of the gods, and his results testify to that. Now, there was no reason to interfere 
with success.
Fear of the veto and, likely, the possibility of divine disfavor moved the consuls to 
allow the Senate to decide the issue. The Senate declared that both consuls would take 
Italy as a province to deal with the Celts, while Flamininus would remain in Greece (Livy 
32.28.4-10).
All sources claim the amici of Flamininus convinced the patres to keep
77Flamininus in command, but other factors may have contributed to the decision. First, 
senatorial fear of a large Celtic attack made it easier to assign both consuls to handle the 
problem and leave Macedon to the man already there. Lack of success had been brought 
on by constant changes in command, so it was better to keep the experienced and
7Rsuccessful general in the area he knew.
Once again, though, circumstance favored Flamininus. The people of Opus, in 
Locris, had tried to oust the Macedonian garrison, but the soldiers had blockaded 
themselves into the citadel. The poorer members of Opus called upon the Aetolians for 
help, while the more affluent summoned the Romans. Neither side was able to elicit 
surrender from the Macedonians. Before the Romans began besieging the citadel, a 
messenger from Philip arrived to propose a peace conference (Livy 32.32.1-6; Plut. Flam. 
5.4). Flamininus granted the conference with some reservation, not knowing whether he
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would be prorogued. But, the meeting provided him with a unique opportunity to chart 
his success.
Flamininus knew that a treaty had to be confirmed by the Senate before it became 
binding, thus, if  Philip -  who at this point seemed anxious for an end to Roman 
involvement -  could be convinced that a reasonable treaty would be granted to him, then 
it gave Flamininus the chance to orchestrate affairs in one of two directions. If the Senate 
had chosen one of the new consuls to replace Flamininus, then his am id  and agents 
would push for the ratification of the treaty. Once ratified Flamininus would then be 
given credit for concluding the war on favorable terms toward Rome. On the other hand, 
if the patres prorogued him, the am id  were to sabotage the peace talks in Rome and have 
war restarted.29
The conference took place at the Malian Gulf near Nicaea. On the first day of the 
meeting, the coalition demanded much from Philip. Flamininus demanded that Philip 
remove his garrisons from all Greek cities, return any captives of Romans allies, restore 
Illyria to Rome, and return certain cities to King Ptolemy of Egypt. Attalus wanted ships 
and prisoners from the battle of Chios returned, and the restoration of the Temple of 
Venus. The Rhodians wanted the region of Peraea and the evacuation of garrisons in 
Iasus, Bargyliae, Euromenses, Sestus and Abydus. They also demanded that Perinthus be 
returned to the Byzantines, and all ports in Asia to be free, whether or not Philip 
controlled them. The Achaeans wanted Corinth and Argos returned to the league, and the 
Aetolians reiterated the Roman demands and added that they wanted all former 
possessions returned to them (Livy 32.33.3-11; Polyb. 18.1.12-2.6).
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The demands were sweeping, and Philip said he would only agree to some of 
them, such as returning Peraea to Rhodes, Argos to the Achaean and ships and men to 
Attalus. He brushed off the other points and intimated that he wanted to speak to 
Flamininus about them. The day ended with nothing resolved (Polyb. 18.4.4-7.7; Livy 
32.34).
The conference was scheduled to begin again in the morning, but just before 
sundown Philip requested a private meeting with Flamininus. The consul granted the 
meeting reluctantly. After a while, the new terms were delivered to the allies. Rome 
regained Illyria, Argos and Corinth were returned to the Achaeans, Peraea went back to 
Rhodes, the ships and men, and the orchard for the temple of Venus were rewarded to 
Attalus, while Pharsalus and Larisa were given to the Aetolians. This news upset all the 
allies, and the second day ended with nothing accomplished (Livy 32.35; Polyb. 18.8).
On the third day, Philip requested that the matter be referred to the Roman senate 
to decide. The allies feared that Philip was seeking a delaying tactic in order to build up 
forces, but agreed to a two-month truce if the Macedonian garrisons at Locris and Phocis 
were withdrawn. Flamininus sent his own embassy made up of Appius Claudius, 
Quintus Fulvius, Quintus Fabius and the Greek Amynander, who had helped free Gomphi 
(Livy 32.36; Polyb. 18.9.6-10.11). Flamininus knew Amynander would support 
whatever his friends directed (Polyb. 18.10.5-8).
Flamininus had achieved his goal. He had lured Philip into attempting arbitration 
in Rome. Many issues turn on this event mid those following. One of the major 
questions concerns the change in Flamininus’ position from the first day to the second.
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His terms on the first day closely resembled those at Aous. They were harsh and all 
encompassing; Philip must free all of the Greek cities. But on the second day, after their 
private conference without any allied representatives present, Flamininus delivered 
extremely lenient terms. This massive shift in position has understandably attracted 
much attention from scholars.
But Flamininus had simply changed his position in order to give himself the 
chance to end or continue the war. Absolute freedom of Greece was not a policy that
« i nbound him in his negotiations. Obviously, the consul negotiated terms that would be 
agreeable to the Senate, or else he would not have announced them. If the Senate refused 
the terms, hypothesizing that they, in truth, wanted all of Greece free, the renewal of 
combat did not guarantee Flamininus prorogation (as many other ambitious men could 
take his place).
When embassies arrived in Rome, it was discovered that Flamininus had been
1 1
prorogued. The Greek allies spoke first and focused on geography. The envoys made it 
clear that if Philip held Demetrias in Thessaly, Chalcis in Euboea, and Corinth in Achaea, 
then Greece would remain under the Macedonian king’s power. Philip had called the 
cities the “Three Fetters.” The speeches o f the Greek ambassadors had a strong impact 
on the Senate (Livy 32.37.1-4; Polyb. 18.11.1-13). When the Macedonian 
representatives began giving their argument, the Senators interrupted to ask if Macedon 
was prepared to evacuate the “Three Fetters?” The envoys replied that they had no 
instructions concerning the Fetters, and the Senate simply dismissed them without
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hearing any more, or granting a peace. Once the Greek envoys had left, the Senate gave 
Flamininus complete discretion to end the war.
Flamininus had played a very serious game with his allies and Philip. The content 
of their private meeting is lost to history, but it remains logical to assume that he duped 
Philip. Several reasons will serve to illustrate the point. First, Philip suggested 
arbitration to the Senate. If he had believed there was a good chance he would not get at 
least some of what he had been promised, then he would not have agreed to arbitration in 
the first place.' Second, the “Three Fetters” were not part of the deal. Whether 
Flamininus promised Philip that the Fetters would not be a topic of arbitration, or that 
they never even discussed them, is impossible to prove, and irrelevant.34 What matters is 
Flamininus had let Philip believe they were not an issue. Thus, the Three Fetters became 
the instrument of disruption for his followers to make use of in Rome, if needed. In the 
end, circumstances had favored Flamininus, and he was able to continue the war.
Erich Gruen presents another viewpoint on the controversy. He saw the Greek 
allies’ demands and schemes as a difficulty that Flamininus had constantly to factor into 
his own plans. To Gruen, the Greeks were not mere pawns for Flamininus to use as he 
felt, but people trying to accomplish their own designs at the expense of the Romans and 
Macedonians. He makes a good point, especially when it comes to Nicaea, where 
Flamininus had needed their support to show his progress to the Senate and thus keep his 
plans in motion. On the other hand, up to this point, Flamininus had only been 
diplomatic out of military necessity. He had made peace with Epirus for supply lines, 
and lent troops to the Amanthanaes to help capture Gomphi. His recent diplomacy had
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been done out of a fear of being replaced, not because the Greeks’ requests factored 
heavily into his plans.
When word reached Philip that the war would be decided on the battlefield, he 
gathered his forces and sent an offer to Nabis of Sparta to take control of Argos, in order 
to deal with the southern portion of Achaea. Nabis had wanted the citizens to invite him 
to take their city, but when he discovered their contempt for him, he accepted Philip’s 
offer, and by night, the Macedonians snuck the Spartans into Argos (Livy 32.38.1-7).
But Nabis had his own plans. With the large number of Greek poleis joining the 
Romans, he saw Philip’s likelihood of victory dwindling. In an attempt to solidify Nabis’ 
support, Philip had promised him the city if Rome should overcome Macedon. So, Philip 
decided to insure its loyalty. Upon taking possession of Argos, Nabis had levied 
enormous fines against the nobility, and any who failed to pay were tortured. Then he 
cancelled debts and redistributed land to the lower classes in order to gain the majority 
support (Livy 32.38.7-9).
Now with Argos under his control, Nabis double-crossed Philip and offered 
Flamininus his aid. The two met at Mycenica, near Argos. Flamininus -  having been 
joined by his brother and Attalus -  demanded auxiliaries from the Spartans and an end to 
the conflict with Achaea. Nabis agreed to the first demand, but would only agree to a 
temporary armistice until the Macedonian war had concluded (Livy 32.39). Flamininus 
had never shown concern over the involvement of the Spartans, but with them turned 
against Philip, he gained two advantages. First, he did not have to worry about a relief 
force coming up from the south either to join Philip or to cut into his supply lines.
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Second, Nabis’ defection kept the Achaean allies focused on the task at hand rather than 
on affairs at home.
In the spring, Flamininus eagerly prepared to bring Philip to battle. First, though, 
he wanted to secure Boeotia, a region that had been previously undecided in their 
support. Along with Attalus and other allies, Flamininus approached the Boeotian capital 
of Thebes without any accompanying soldiers. Flamininus, however, had ordered 2,000 
men to follow a mile behind. The hilly terrain of the area hid their presence, and the 
Thebans watched the Boeotian leader Antiphilius meet Flamininus outside the walls. 
Seeing no troops, the city defenses were lax. As the proconsul and Antiphilius neared 
Thebes, however, the hastatii rushed past them into the city. The Boeotians, believing 
their leader had betrayed the city to the Romans, did not mobilize in retaliation, and a 
council was held (Livy 33.1).
Attalus began the council, but collapsed during his speech. Aristaenus replaced 
him, conveying the same message that he had to the Achaean League: Roman force must 
be heeded and better to support it than battle it. Flamininus himself then briefly 
discussed Roman loyalty to allies, and the fearful Boeotians unanimously voted to join 
the coalition (Livy 33.2; Plut. Flam. 6). Flamininus did not employ peaceable means to 
win over the Greeks; he used raw force to compel the Boeotians into an alliance. With 
their city in the hands of the coalition, the Thebans had no choice but to follow the 
Romans. Flamininus’ real goal behind gaining the “confidence” of the Boeotians was to 
secure the remaining areas in his rear (Livy 33.2.9), not because he wanted them free 
from Macedonian oppression.
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Flamininus now had virtually all of Greece in alliance, with the exception of some 
cities like Atrax that had resisted his sieges.
Cynoscephalae is often glossed over as an easy victory for the Romans, and that 
the outcome was never in doubt. In the mind of Flamininus, this sentiment may very well 
have been true, but in reality, the Roman victory was far from certain. Nonetheless, it 
was upon the outcome of this battle that the future of Flamininus turned.
After the failure of the embassy in Rome, Philip had fewr options. He had lost the 
support of Greece, and years of constant warfare forced him to bolster his ranks with 
sixteen-year-old boys (Livy 33.3.1-6). The Macedonian army amounted to 23,500 men 
and 2,000 cavalry. Instead of returning to the hills, he decided to risk the outcome of 
the war on a single battle. Philip’s next goal was to find a suitable place in Thessaly to 
fight the Romans, whereas Flamininus simply wanted to do battle as soon as possible.
Flamininus moved north from Elatia to Heraclea where he asked the Aetolian 
council for aid; they mustered 6,000 infantry and 400 cavalry for the Romans. This 
brought the Roman army up to about 26,000 men.39
Flamininus moved toward Phthiotic Thebes, near the Pagasean Gulf, hoping it 
would come over to his side. He sent a small force that was repulsed and almost 
destroyed, had a relief force not saved them, and Flamininus gave up on taking the city 
when he received word that Philip had entered Thessaly (Livy 33.5.1-5).
Both armies had encamped near Pherae; Philip to the north and Flamininus to the 
south. A brief and inconclusive cavalry skirmish took place. Each commander decided 
to move away from the area, as gardens and low walls predominated the area, not making
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a desirable battleground. Philip headed southwest toward Scotussa, a city with many 
fields, to resupply his army. Flamininus anticipated this move, and hastened to reach the 
fields first, to bum them out.40
Hills separated the adversaries, which caused them to lose sight of each other. 
They marched for three days, making camp without the other in sight. On the third day, 
the Romans had encamped near Thetideum and remained inside their walls because of a 
strong thunderstorm and thick fog. Philip had broken camp, but the fog proved to be too 
dense to find the road, so he made a fourth camp near the hills called Cynoscephalae. 
The king then sent a force to hold the summits of the hills. Although Flamininus kept the 
army within the camp, he sent out a reconnaissance force in an attempt to locate Philip 
(Livy 33.6-7.4; Polyb. 18.19-20).
The following description is a condensed version of the battle. The Roman 
scouting party discovered the Macedonians, despite the fog. Skirmishing took place els 
messengers mshed back to their respective camps. The Macedonians pushed back a 
Roman scouting force until reinforcements (mostly Aetolian) arrived from Flamininus, 
forcing the Macedonians to retreat to the hilltops. As the Romans advanced toward the 
summits, a Macedonian relief arrived, forcing the Romans to retreat to the base of the 
hills.
Flamininus led his army out in battle formation. He placed half the Romans and 
half the Greek allies on the left wing. On the right, he did the same, with the majority of 
the allies here being Aetolian, and stationed elephants in front of the entire line. Philip, 
who had sent out large foraging parties because he did not think a battle would occur,
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rushed to recall troops and put them into formation. Flamininus led the left wing up the 
hill, while ordering the right to remain as it was. With half of the phalanx, Philip moved 
down the slopes to meet the Roman advance. The phalanx pushed the Romans backward, 
and seeing victory within his grasp, Philip had the phalanx reform to double depth to 
finish the Romans. As this went on, the remainder of the Macedonian phalanx formed at 
the top of the hill. Flamininus switched over to his right wing and ordered them to 
advance before the phalanx was fully organized. With elephants and cavalry leading the 
way, the Macedonian left broke and began to flee. Thus, the right wings of each army 
were dominating. Then the decisive moment came: an unknown Roman tribune within 
the Roman right -  comprehending the entire situation -  detached 20 maniples and sent 
them downhill into the rear of the Macedonian phalanx. Disorder followed, and a rout 
ensued. Philip fled with a small body of men. The total casualties for the battle were 
8,000 dead, plus 5,000 captured on the Macedonian side and 1,000 dead on the Roman 
side.41
The victory had importance comparable to Zama, in terms of its long-lasting 
consequences to the growth of the Empire. In the aftermath of Cynoscephalae, Rome 
solidified a role in Eastern affairs until the Western Empire fell and the conquest placed 
Flamininus closer to his aim of being a great man. Flamininus had consistently pushed 
for a crucial battle to end the conflict as he needed a military solution to insure a triumph, 
and power that accompanied it. Nothing else could have fulfilled his ambition. From the 
outset, he had attempted to force combat on Philip, even chancing the attack on the well- 
fortified positions at Aous Valley. His strategy always favored resolution by arms. For
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example, Flamininus besieged numerous towns such as Atrax, Gomphi, and Phaloria; he 
used a stealth attack to force the surrender of Thebes; he negotiated with the Epirots only 
to secure supply lines; and he deceived Philip to continue the war. He had taken 
numerous risks to secure gloria and auctoritas for himself, and although he had chosen 
an uncertain course, it gained him the desired end.
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CHAPTER TWO ENDNOTES
1. Plut. Flam. 4.1; Livy 32.9.8-10. Once he reached the Aous Valley he attacked. 
Eckstein (“Flamininus," 127-8) following Livy (32.9.6-11) says that at the council 
Flamininus called, upon relieving Villius of command, he and most others 
favored the strategy of going through the Dassaretii to Lyncus to reach the interior 
of Macedonia -  most likely to assault Pella. Plutarch offers a more likely version. 
Flamininus recognized immediately the possible danger to his supply lines if the 
legions traveled through the mountainous terrain into the interior {Flam. 4.1). 
Plutarch and Livy both mention Flamininus’ fear that Philip would disappear into 
the forests and the campaigning season would be wasted. Another reason must 
have been the fear that Philip might be able to trap, ambush or flank them in 
unknown territory. Both Plutarch and Livy portray Flamininus as overly eager to 
begin the campaign. The new consul’s quick arrival in Macedon surprised Villius 
(Eckstein, “Flamininus,” 128) as Flamininus rushed over to Hellas to defeat Philip 
before his time ran out. Upon taking command of the Roman camp, and finding 
Philip and the entire Macedonian army before him, the decision to forego the 
roundabout stratagem must have been too appealing.
2. I follow the account in Plutarch {Flam. 4.2) rather than in Livy (32.9.6-11-10.1). 
Flamininus was eager and had hastened to his province (Livy 32.9.6-11), having 
even foregone the normal privileges and honors of his office to get to Macedonia 
with alacrity (Plut. Flam. 3.1-3). A determined man like Flamininus would not 
waste 40 days trying to decide a course of action; he would act. N. G. L. 
Hammond (“The Opening Campaigns and the Battle of Aoi Stena in the Second 
Macedonian War,” JRS 56 (1966) 52, n.37) disagrees, using the sentence in Livy 
{diesque quadraginta sine ullo conatu sedentes in conspectu hostium 
absumpserant) as evidence against sorties (32.10.1). Hammond also notes, 
however, that Plutarch does suggest constant fighting up until the conference with 
Philip and that Plutarch’s account seems more accurate.
3. Harris, 166-171.
4. Much of the scholarship involves examining Flamininus as an agent of the 
Senate, which gave the consul instructions dealing with Greek freedom and treaty 
terms. Badian hypothesizes that the Senate had developed a policy to create a 
Greek protectorate with Philip serving them as a client-prince. Badian wants to 
give Flamininus credit, with help from the Greek allies, as the progenitor of the 
policy slogan “freedom of the Greeks.” The policy was not mere propaganda, but 
directly reflected the core interest of Rome to bring Greece under their suzerainty.
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He believes that Flamininus acted under direct orders from the senate (Foreign 
Clientela, 66-71). Walbank {Philip V o f Macedon, Archon Books, 1967, 150), 
Frank (161, n. 29) and Gruen (101-103) all agree that Flamininus put forth the 
demands according to senatorial orders. Wood believes that Flamininus had 
instructions of some type, but that his own zeal and inexperience made him get 
carried away and ask for too much (“Campaign of Titus Quinctius Flamininus in 
198 BC,” 282). The one who comes closest to it is Eckstein {Senate and General: 
Individual Decision Making and Roman Foreign Relations, 264-194 BC> 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 277). He conjectures that the 
Senate had a general war aim, but with nothing set. Possibly eager for glory, 
Flamininus decided to make the terms harsh, so that if Philip accepted them, then 
everything Rome wanted would be achieved and the Senate would heap praise 
upon him. Most likely, the Senate did not have many specific guidelines as 
Flamininus altered his demands to a large degree at the Conference of Nicaea.
This paper posits that Flamininus, despite flexible or indeterminate instructions 
from the patres, did not view a peaceful settlement as a viable option at that time. 
He had approximately ten months to continue prosecuting the war, and simply, he 
wanted to overcome Philip on the battleground. He gave Philip terms the man 
would never accept. Gruen theorizes that Philip surprised Flamininus when he 
tried to negotiate and that Flamininus thought the king tried to shift the blame for 
the war onto the Romans (Gruen, 102-3). It merely gave Flamininus the chance 
to make the terms harsher. Gloria awaited the victorious general, not the 
formulator of a peace treaty. His culture demanded a finish wrought in blood, not 
inscribed in stone.
5. Livy 32.12; Plut. Flam. 4.4-6. Here I chose to combine both Livy and Plutarch, 
as the events of the battle flow together better. Livy says that the tribune should 
send up a smoke signal upon reaching the designated spot and then await the reply 
signal (32.11.8). However, this seems unlikely as the Macedonians were 
stationed all over the defile and surely would have noticed a smoke signal going 
up in the rear of their forces. In addition, holding off the attack until the Romans 
sighted the signal leaves time for the Macedonians to prepare their forces for the 
coming assault. Also, Livy does not mention a reply signal actually having been 
given. Plutarch provides a more realistic version and was the one followed in this 
text. Waiting until the battle raged would be the best time for the signal. 
Naturally, the detachment force would have sent out scouts to determine the best 
time to enter the battle, so as to completely demoralize the Macedonians. Starting 
the smoke signal lightly is a good tactic as well, since many of the enemy soldiers 
would have been familiar with the region and morning mist would not have 
caused undue alarm.
6. Plut. Flam. 1.3; Scullard, Roman Politics, 100-1.
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7. Adkins, 92. A less spectacular version of a triumph.
8. Plutarch notes that the leniency dictated by Flamininus helped him win over the 
Achaeans {Flam. 5.1-4). This point has some soundness, but he had demonstrated 
clemency on a very infrequent basis. The fear o f military force is what convinced 
them to join Rome
9. Eckstein makes a valid point in his argument that Flamininus did not turn south 
until Gomphi fell to the Roman-Athamane coalition, as that way had been 
previously blocked with a Macedonian garrison. He states, however, that Roman 
forces had already been fighting with the Athamanes (“Flamininus,” 131-134), 
though Livy stated clearly that the Athamanes did not launch any rejuvenated 
assaults until after news of the Roman victory had spread (32.14.1-2). One may 
postulate that Flamininus had foreseen the possibility of failure at the Aous River 
and accordingly started secondary operations. The sources say nothing of this, so 
it must be assumed that he simply took advantage of a favorable opportunity.
10. Mommsen, 428; Badian “Philhellenism,” 273-297; Balsdon, “Flamininus,” 179.
11. Badian, “Philhellenism,” 274-327; Gruen, 256, 259, 268.
12. Badian, “Philhellenism,” 326.
13. Gruen, 268.
14. Gruen, 270-2.
15. Plut. Cato. 23.1-3; Gruen, 260-1; Alan E. Astin, Cato the Censor, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1978, 170-5.
16. Livy 39.8-18; Gruen, 262.
17. Gruen, 260-272.
18. Eckstein, “Flamininus,” 131-2.
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19. Eckstein, “Flamininus,” 131-2.
20. Flamininus’ brother Lucius managed the naval arm of the command.
21. Badian claims that Aristaenus’ use of Roman force, as a means to push the 
council over to the pro-Roman side was empty. He thinks Flamininus would not 
have attacked the council if they had refused. In terms of Flamininus5 obsession 
to bring Philip to battle, the likelihood of him turning to punish the Achaean 
League was slim (“Philhellenism,” 287). But as Eckstein illustrates, Lucius 
crushed the Acamanians in 197 when they rescinded Roman friendship after 
having agreed to it. Though different in details, the cases are similar. Roman 
force remained a definite possibility and a possibility is all that was needed to be 
guaranteed in the negotiation (“Flamininus,” 140-1).
22. Frederic M. Wood sees the Achaean alliance as one part in Flamininus’ plan to 
end the war and set up Roman-Hellenistic relations for the future (“The Military 
and Diplomatic Campaign of T. Quinctius Flamininus in 198 B.C ” AJP 32
(1938): 177-189). In reaction to the Holleaux theory that Roman arms pushed the 
Achaeans into the alliance (n. 28), Wood posits Flamininus and his “plan” as the 
reason for Roman success. They feared Rome, and Flamininus just happened to 
be the one who had proven successful. Badian states that, “What mattered was 
less the quick defeat of Philip than the winning of Greece (“Philhellenism,” 309). 
And when diplomatic progress in Greece proved slow because of well-founded 
old suspicions which the first two years of the new war had done nothing to 
dispel, the resort to military pressure against the Achaeans can be seen as almost a 
measure of despair.” This statement misses the point. Flamininus still wanted his 
military victory. As Eckstein states very well, “Flamininus in 198 considered 
diplomacy with the Greeks no more than a side-show to the war with Philip” 
(“Flamininus,” 140). Flamininus did not go to the conference, nor did he instruct 
his brother to do so, but sent a legate instead. Each brother stayed intent upon his 
military operations.
23. Walbank states that the Achaean League had no choice, as they could only fail 
against Rome. The coalition also crushed Philip’s chance at central power in 
Greece (Philip V, 158-9).
24. Gruen sensibly argues that prorogation was not guaranteed. Gallic revolts and the 
efforts of his supporters enhancing his accomplishments played more of a part in 
convincing the Senate than anything else (214-7).
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25. Walbank, Philip V, 159.
26. Neither Polybius nor Plutarch mentions the religious circumstances. This is only 
found in Livy.
27. Plutarch {Flam. 7.1-2), Livy (32.32.6-8), and Polybius (18.11.1-3) all agree that 
the friends of Flamininus got him prorogued. The extended combat in the Punic 
Wars may have influenced some senators to place value in keeping a successful 
commander in the field longer rather than replacing him every year. Scipio ended 
the Hannibalic War by commanding in Africa for three consecutive years and 
before dying in battle, Marcellus had made great headway by commanding in 
Sicily.
28. Mommsen presents the view that a change of command had been one of the 
factors in the lack of Roman success (432). Gruen has reservations about this 
premise, but does not completely discoimt it (215-6).
29. Badian, “Philhellenism,” 310.
30. The topic of senatorial instructions has already been discussed in note 5, but bears 
reiteration: Flamininus had no set policy to follow. The idea that Flamininus 
deceived Philip to gain the best possible outcome for himself is followed by 
several scholars including Badian (“Philhellenism, 310-3), Scullard (Roman 
Politics, 103), Eckstein {General, 281-2) and Walbank {Philip V, 162).
31. Livy (32.28.8-9) and Polybius (18.11.1-3) both agree that the Senate had 
prorogued Flamininus before the Macedonian and Greek embassies had an 
audience with the patres. Plutarch’s chronology of the situation is unclear {Flam. 
7.1-2).
32. The basic story of the Macedonian allies being asked about the “Fetters” and then 
dismissed by the Senate exists in several sources: Livy 32.37.5, Polyb. 18.11,
Zon. 9.16, App. Mac. 8 (from the Same). Plutarch {Flam. 7.1-2) only mentions 
that the Macedonians failed, but gives no details beyond the aid of Flamininus’ 
friend in foiling it.
33. Eckstein, General, 280-1.
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34. Eckstein, General, 281-2.
35. Gruen, 447.
36. An old man Attalus probably suffered a stroke during the speech as Livy (33.2.1- 
4) describes him collapsing and having partial paralysis. He died sometime after 
Cynoscephalae and both Livy (33.21.1=5) and Polybius (18.41) had words of 
praise for him.
37. Livy states he had 16,000 men in the phalanx, 2,000 peltasts, 2,000 Illyrians,
2,000 Thracians, 1,500 auxiliaries from various Greekpoleis and 2,000 cavalry 
(33.4). The cavalry arm of Philip V lacked the same mobility that had allowed 
Philip II and Alexander to be so effective with it. Although he had 2,000 
horsemen, they did not prove to be a decisive factor in the battle.
38. Livy 33.3.1-2; Walbank, Philip V, 167. Philip understood the reality of Rome’s 
purpose. Even if Flamininus failed, someone else would replace him. Trying to 
defeat Flamininus remained the best option.
39. Livy (33.3.6-7) states that the Aetolians only provided 600 troops whereas 
Plutarch {Flam. 7.2) gives 6,000 as the number. Walbank {Philip V, 167, n. 3) 
sides with Plutarch and believes Livy mistranslated Polybius. Based upon the 
frequent complaints about credit for the victory by the Aetolians after 
Cynoscephalae, it is logical to agree with Walbank.
40. Livy 33.6; Poly. 18.19-20.1-4; Walbank, Philip V, 169-70.
41. Livy 33.7-10; Polyb. 18.20-27; Plut. Flam. 8. The description in Plutarch is quite 
brief.
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CHAPTER THREE
In the aftermath of Cynoscephalae, Flamininus created further imperialism in the 
East for Rome, and at the same time had to Heal with the failure of his own settlement of 
Greece. To be welcomed home as a true conqueror, and a great man, Flamininus had to 
leave a pacified Greece behind him. A region embroiled in post-war chaos only invited a 
successor to “properly” reduce the area, and a situation like that would diminish his 
auctoritas. Flamininus knew very wrell that the Senate had no intention of annexing 
Greece or Macedon. Thus, with Flamininus’ original need for glory satisfied, employing 
military force became a secondary tool. Diplomacy, and more precisely propaganda, 
became his primary instrument to peacefully settle Greece.
He had used diplomatic measures on a limited basis to insure a military solution 
to the war: securing supply lines in Epirus, garnering Achaean support, and deceiving 
Philip at Nicaea, all were aimed at continuing the war. Now, Flamininus wielded 
propaganda as his weapon, and with its twisted edge, he hacked out the peace settlement 
in Greece. Driven by the necessity of a definite conclusion to the war so another could 
not pilfer his gloria, Flamininus worked within established Greek propaganda. He 
disseminated the idea of Greek freedom (eleulheria) -  an old Hellenistic device -  by 
promising to remove all Roman troops from Greece. His intention was to solidify his 
place as a man comparable to Scipio, by propagating Roman hegemony in the East.
Flamininus utilized the propaganda slogan “freedom of the Greeks” after 
Cynoscephalae. One of the mqjor disputes about this slogan is its origin. Badian argues 
that the phrase had a Roman origin. He says it was a natural evolution of Roman foreign
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policy. The Greeks who gained their freedom were truly free, but had an extra-legal 
obligation to Rome as per the patron-client relationship. He does not, however, provide 
any examples or evidence for his hypothesis.1
In fact, Lintott rejects the term “client-king” and the patron-client relationship as a 
valid way of viewing the association between Rome and those she defeated in war. He 
thinks Rome placed Macedon into a dependent affiliation, but that this relationship had a 
loose definition of what obligations the “client” actually had to Rome. Even though 
Rome bound Macedon by treaty, in many ways she allowed Philip, and later Perseus, a 
great deal of liberty in their actions most of the time. Patron-client may be a convenient 
way of terming the relationship between Rome and defeated foreign powers, but it does 
not possess the strictly defined duties or notions of reciprocity that characterized the 
patron-client relationship on the personal level.
Also in refutation to Badian, Gruen identifies the slogan as one used throughout 
the East from the beginning of the Hellenistic Age. The meaning of the phrase lacked 
preciseness on purpose; it was a diplomatic implement to win the support of the people. 
Gruen cites numerous examples including: Polyperchon using it to rally support against 
Cassander and Antigonus in 319 (Diod. 18.55-57); Antigonus Doson employed the 
slogan against Philip in 220 (Polyb. 4.25.6-8); and Philip used it in trying to ally with Elis 
in 218 (Polyb. 4.84.4-5). It had become a familiar motto preached by commanders 
throughout the East, to legitimize their actions. Flamininus took the idea and made use of 
it in the perfect context. What better way to convince people of a pretended closeness to 
their culture then to use a time-honored phrase at a time of great uncertainty.
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After the battle Philip had escaped, gathered survivors, and fled to Larisa. As 
Flamininus approached Larisa, a herald met him and asked for a truce and burial rights. 
Flamininus granted both and said the king should not be afraid. The Aetolians became 
angry, claiming Flamininus had changed and did not consult the allies with the battle now 
won (Livy 33.11.4-6). Here began the rift between the Aetolians and Flamininus, which 
proved to be a gaping hole in his peace settlement.
The Aetolians had antagonized Flamininus because during the battle many had 
abandoned pursuit of the Macedonians to sack the enemy camp. Roman troops 
complained to Flamininus that they had won the battle, but the allies collected all the 
booty (Livy 33.11.7; Polyb. 18.27). The Aetolians had also insinuated that Flamininus 
had tried to extort loot and favor from Philip at their expense. Indignant over the charges, 
not to mention the complaints of his men, Flamininus did what he could to diminish the 
Aetolian role in post-war proceedings.4 They may not have been far off the mark, 
though. Now that Philip had been conquered, things had changed; Rome held all the 
cards.
Before meeting Philip, Flamininus called a conference with the allies. The 
majority wanted conditions imposed that allowed Greece the ability to enforce her own 
peace and freedom in the absence of Rome. In addition to this, the Aetolians wanted 
Philip eliminated, saying he would bide his time and assault Greece again. Flamininus 
answered with three arguments. The first being that Rome did not obliterate surrendered 
foes, but showed mercy to bring peace, as in the case of the Carthaginians* Next, he 
pointed out that the peoples bordering Hellas-the Thracians, Illyrians and Gauls-would
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sweep through Greece if a strong Macedon were not there to act as a line of defense. 
Last, he told the Aetolians that Macedon would no longer be able to start a war once the 
peace terms were concluded (Livy 33.12),
Interestingly enough, Flamininus did not mention Gauls or Celts among those 
peoples shown clemency to by Rome. In fact, his enumeration of Gauls and Thracians 
among the border peoples indicates Rome perceived them to be barbaric, and thus 
relegated to a less civilized form of dominion. His words echo and reinforce Badian’s 
theory of hegemonial imperialism being suited for Eastern states, versus all out warfare 
and reduction in the West.
All of the points Flamininus had given were to some degree true. Rome did not 
eradicate surrendered opponents, with Carthage and Illyria being good examples at this 
time,5 although the peace Rome brought to each did involve the conquered accepting 
Rome’s dominion over them. Illyria had become a protectorate, and Carthage no longer 
determined her own foreign policy.6 Yet the whole threat of the Thracians and Gauls 
could be real, and the Illvrians to a lesser extent. Rome worried little about the incursions 
of these peoples. She was more concerned about balancing the area. If Macedon ceased 
to be, then it was likely that the Aetolians would invade the region of Macedonia, or 
possibly the Achaean League might grow to dominate Greece. Rome did not necessarily 
fear invasion, but the Hannibalic War had proven that a neighboring state that had grown 
too powerful could pose a grave threat.7 In addition, snubbing the Aetolians before the 
other Roman allies diminished their importance in the proceedings, rebalancing the 
Greeks.
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A peace conference with Philip followed, in which the king willingly granted all 
concessions from the previous peace and, playing to Flamininus, would let the Senate 
decide any other conditions. When the Aetolians requested several cities to be returned, 
Philip agreed. But Flamininus objected to the Aetolians’ request, only giving them 
Phthiotic Thebes. The Aetolians claimed that it belonged to them by right of the 211 
treaty with Rome. The conditions gave land and cities to the Aetolians, while the 
Romans took moveable booty. Flamininus retorted that the Aetolians had broken the 
treaty by making a separate peace with Philip, and the treaty did not include cities that 
surrendered to Rome (Livy 33.13.1-13; Polyb. 18.39).
Much discussion has gone into this quarrel,8 but at this point the legality of the 
situation was moot. Whether or not the Aetolians had a legal claim to the cities did not 
matter to Flamininus. The Romans were the victors in the war, and with the allies’ 
support behind him, he did not brook with any kind of negotiation from the Aetolians. 
Simply put, as the winners, the Romans could decide the fate of Greece.9
Flamininus made Philip pay 200 talents and surrender hostages, including his son 
Demetrius, in exchange for a four-month truce, to allow his ambassadors to go before the 
Senate. If peace were not granted, then all would be returned to Philip (Livy 33.13.13- 
15; Polyb. 18.39).
Did Flamininus hurry to construct a peace agreement with Philip because he had 
news of Antiochus’ preparations for an invasion of Greece, and did he fear that Philip 
would flee to a city and await Seleucid help? If this occurred, Rome might send a new 
consul to replace him, and he would lose gloria for not finishing the war. The news most
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likely caused Flamininus some consternation, but Philip himself had no desire to drag the 
conflict out any longer. He had been at war for three years, and had lost two major 
engagements in the past year alone. All of Greece opposed him, and the likelihood of 
Antiochus coming to his aid was bleak.10 Whether Flamininus remained or left did not 
matter to Philip. Rome would send someone else, and a greater army. Philip understood 
the realities of his position vis-a-vis Rome. He decided to recoup Macedon by settling 
for peace.11
In other areas around Hellas, the last remnants of Macedonian opposition were 
being squashed. A Greek force under Nicostratus defeated the Macedonian general 
Androsthenes (Livy 33.14-15), and Lucius Flamininus defeated the pro-Macedonian 
Acamanians (Livy 33.16-17). Last, Rhodes, with the support of other Greek troops, 
retook Peraea (Livy 33.18).
Back in Rome, elections of 196 were held. Lucius Furius Purpureo and Marcus 
Claudius Marcellus won their bids for the consulship. The previous year’s consuls had 
both fought Gauls on the borders of Italy, and the Senate again suggested Italy as the 
province for the two newly elected consuls. Both consuls -  but especially Marcellus -  
appealed to the Senate to declare Macedonia as one of the provinces. He claimed that 
Philip planned to rebel when Roman forces left. His words carried away the 
imaginations of many senators, but the tribunes, Quintus Marcius Ralla and Gaius Atinius 
Labeo, threatened to veto the motion until the people voted for the peace. The people 
unanimously passed the motion for peace. At that time, news of a Roman defeat in
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Nearer Spain reached the Senate. The Senate prorogued Flamininus for another year with 
imperium (Livy 33.25.4-11).
Since his involvement in Macedonia, Flamininus’ amici had taken measures to 
insure his success. In 198, senators had forced tribunes opposing his candidature to relent 
in favor of a vote. In 197, his amici had tribunes threaten to veto senatorial motions to 
replace Flamininus. In 196, tribunes had again threatened the veto in order to have his 
peace treaty passed. On these two occasions, the tribunes had withheld exercising the 
veto by allowing the decision to be referred to the comitia centuriata. Each time they 
were successful. Flamininus had his supporters in place and made clever use of the 
tribunate to prevent invidia from ending his pursuit of auctoritas. Rewards could ensue 
as Atilius, the tribune who had help him in 197, became praetor only two years later.
Compared to Scipio, Flamininus needed to go to greater lengths to keep his 
military command. Only in 201 did the tribunate help Scipio retain his proconsular 
power against the attack of Lentulus, and one of the tribunes -  Glabrio -  benefited 
handsomely from the relationship, as he went on to become consul in 191. Scipio’s own 
abilities, his immense popularity, and the continued threat of Hannibal had insured his 
reappointments. At the end of his tenure in Greece, Flamininus did enjoy some degree of 
Scipio’s popularity, but Philip was not a threat to Rome in the same way Hannibal had 
been, and so Flamininus had to utilize other tools to keep himself in power.
Rebellion broke out in Boeotia when the people elected Brachyllas, a pro- 
Macedonian, as the Boeotarch. The pro-Roman contingent feared that Philip would 
recapture the area once the Romans left, and the two rebel leaders, Peisistratus and
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Zeuxippus, had Brachyllas assassinated. The plot was subsequently uncovered and 
Peisistratus and his followers were executed, though Zeuxippus escaped. The Thebans 
revolted, as they believed that Zeuxippus had acted with Roman consent. Hundreds of 
Roman soldiers died. Flamininus besieged Thebes when the murderers of his soldiers 
and reparation payment were not brought to him. A group of Achaeans and Athenians 
arrived gaining the Boeotians an audience with Flamininus after saying they would join 
the Boeotians against Rome if they were refused. The audience was granted and 
Flamininus ended the siege when 30 talents and the criminals were handed over to him 
(Livy 33.27.5-29; Polyb. 18.43).
17This incident demonstrates the tenuous nature of the peace. Though still 
unofficial, many Greeks were dubious about the permanency of the settlement. With 
Philip still in power, and the history of Macedonian involvement in Greece, some thought 
the king would return and reintroduce Macedonian hegemony, while others believed they 
had merely traded masters. This forced Flamininus to return to arms as a solution, 
instead of relying on the Greek model of third-party mediation. He stood in a precarious 
place. If revolts broke out and he took the wrong step, Greece might invite Antiochus -  
or even Philip -  to oust the Romans, and his gloria would vanish and a replacement 
proconsul would strive for victory in his place. The Achaeans were far from demanding, 
but the hint that they might turn against Rome showed Flamininus that they had to be 
placated rather than quashed.
Ten ambassadors from Rome arrived in the spring with the approved peace. The 
terms were as follows: all Greek cities in Europe and Asia should exist under their own
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laws and freedom; all cities under a Macedonian garrison were to be given over to Rome 
by the Isthmian Games; Macedonian garrisons were to be removed from key cities 
(Euromum, Pedasa, Bargyliae, Iasus, Myrina, Abydus, Thaos and Perinthus in Asia); all 
Roman prisoners and deserters should be returned, all warships beyond five should be 
surrendered; a maximum of only 5,000 troops and no elephants could be kept; no war 
outside Macedonia could be waged without senatorial approval; and Philip must pay a 
reparation of 1,000 talents to Rome (Livy 33.30; Polyb. 18.44).
Rome had taken an extra measure to placate the Greeks by granting liberty to all 
Greeks cities in Asia, even though the treaty (as mentioned above) had enumerated only 
those specific cities under Macedonian control. The inclusion of all the Greek cites gave 
the impression that Rome was hegemon of the entire Greek world, to help insure their 
loyalty. Furthermore, the addition of the Asian cities gave Rome an excuse/ambiguity in 
order to go to war with Antiochus, as the Seleucid king’s expansion into Europe worried 
the Senate.
The terms of the treaty greatly reduced the power of Macedon. Rome left 
Macedon too weak to present any kind of threat. It also sent a message to the rest of 
Greece; Philip no longer posed an overwhelming danger to them, but was still strong 
enough to balance Aetolia, Achaea and Sparta.13 In part, the terms reflected earlier ones 
that Flamininus had proposed to Philip at Nicaea. They also resembled the imperialistic 
terms given to Carthage at the end of the Hannibalic War. Rome did not annex any 
Macedonian land, but she controlled their foreign policy. Just as Scipio had done with
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the Carthage, Flamininus concluded the war by establishing hegemonial authority over 
Macedon.
The Aetolians complained about the vagueness of the peace terms since the only 
named cities to be freed were in Asia, while the European towns went over to the 
Romans. They called the peace empty, as the Three Fetters remained in Roman hands 
(Livy 33.31; Polyb. 18.45). Though most of Greece supported Rome, the words o f the 
Aetolians began to gain credence with some individuals (Polyb. 18.44.8). Flamininus 
knew firsthand the power of Greek opinion and did not want the Aetolians to rouse a 
rebellion that would jeopardize his chance to conclude the war.14
He met with the ten Roman commissioners concerning the Roman presence in 
Hellas, and put forth a policy of de-garrisoning the countryside to insure the goodwill of 
the Greeks. The commissioners had no problems with Flamininus’ policy, except for the 
Three Fetters. Concern over the maneuvers of Antiochus existed in the Senate, who did 
not want to leave Greece open to a possible invading Seleucid army, since Antiochus 
could view Rome’s declaration that the Asian cities were free of a provocation not a 
warning. Arguments continued until the Achaeans received Corinth back, while 
Flamininus kept Chalcis and Demetrias garrisoned until apprehensions over Antiochus 
had waned (Livy 33.31; Polyb. 18.45.9-12). Flamininus wanted to stop the possibility of 
a revolt, keeping Greece stable under Roman power and-most importantly-he wanted 
Greece pacified so that he gained full credit for ending the war. His anxiety for personal 
profit took precedence over concerns about Antiochus. At this point, however, he could 
not convince the commissioners to follow his advice.15
93
Possibly Flamininus’ most famous act, the Isthmian Declaration, came next. At 
the Isthmian Games, rumors had circulated about a pending announcement concerning 
Roman occupation of Greek cities, and the people waited in anticipation. A Roman 
herald announced that Flamininus had declared the Corinthians, Phthiotic Achaeans, 
Locrians, Magnesians, Euboeans, Phocians, Thessalians, and Perrhaebians-who had been 
under Philip’s power-to be free and under their own laws. The crowd rejoiced, but made 
the herald announce it a second time to insure they had heard him correctly. Later on, in 
their appreciation crowds mobbed Flamininus.16
As has been mentioned before in this paper, Flamininus did not act out of love for 
Greece, but from political necessity. With the fighting over, he then turned to diplomatic 
procedures to conclude the war. Flamininus had not thrown around the phrase “freedom 
of the Greeks” much before the conclusion of the war.17
Although he had beaten Philip, and the Senate had accepted the peace proposal 
with a few modifications, the situation in Greece was not stable. The aggressive 
movements of Antiochus, the uprising of the Boeotians, and the threat that the Achaeans 
and Athenians might join it -  as well as the growing discontent of the people caused by 
Aetolian complaints -  all endangered the peace settlement.
At some point, Flamininus convinced the Roman commissioners to evacuate 
Greece completely. By making the “freedom of the Greeks” proclamation, he solved all 
his problems. The use of the familiar Hellenistic device astounded the Greek audience 
and led them to believe that Rome had genuine knowledge and concern for Greek affairs.
152In truth, most knew this did not mean absolute freedom, but a new hegemon whom they
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hoped would remain out of their affairs until they needed her. Flamininus5 
announcement also silenced the Aetolians, who had chattered about the Romans simply 
feigning departure, and left them appearing ungrateful. Specifying Asian cities as part of 
the resolution, additionally sent a message to Antiochus to stay out, as those cities were 
now free and not to be subjugated. The Greek response to Flamininus5 announcement 
sent another message to the Seleucid king: Greece supported Rome, the state that had 
freed them and would stand against him if he invaded. Personally, these actions imbued 
Flamininus with a large degree of prestige and trust from the Greeks and aided him in his 
future diplomatic work in the region.
The ten commissioners then spread out to different poleis to finalize the peace 
settlement. The commissioner Gnaeus Cornelius went first to Tempe and convinced 
Philip to send ambassadors to the Senate, followed by a trip to Thermopylae to address 
the Pylaic Council. The Aetolians complained, again, about the Romans cutting them out 
in terms of prizes for the settlement, but had to be content with envoys sent off to Rome 
(Livy 38.35). Here, once again, is a perfect example of Rome spreading her influence 
and using her allies.
Flamininus5 time in Greece looked to be at an end, but in the elections for 195 the 
Senate received word of Nabis stirring up trouble in Greece. He had seized Argos, and 
expanded his piratical activities in the Adriatic. Problems in Spain and worries over the 
position of Carthage, if Antiochus should declare war, also held the attention of the 
patres. After much debate, the senators decided that the Spartan problem was of less 
importance than the others and prolonged the command of Flamininus. They gave him
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power to do whatever was best for the state in the settlement of the conflict (Livy 
38.43.6).
The significant question is why would the Senate be concerned with Nabis at all? 
Why not let the Greeks deal with him? The Isthmian Declaration had calmed affairs, but 
Nabis still held Argos, a polis important to Achaean safety, and the Achaeans still feared 
that the Roman “freedom” lacked true sincerity, especially if a tyrant continued to hold 
Argos by force. The Senate wanted the situation stabilized before it complicated things. 
Antiochus’ shadow loomed over Greece and the Aetolians planted discord with their 
constant accusations of Roman deception. Failing to deal with the situation might cause 
the Greeks to welcome Antiochus, and then join him. If this only existed in possibility, it 
warranted a solution before it bloomed into something more. On a more fundamental 
level, any act of independent foreign policy by a polis threatened Rome’s hegemony. 
Greek freedom only existed because Rome allowed it to, and she could not permit actions 
that undermined her authority. The Senate did not even declare war on Sparta, but 
trusted Flamininus to reconcile it, whether by force or diplomacy.19
This situation differed from previous ones. No tribunes came into play to 
continue Flamininus as a proconsul. The war in Macedonia was finished and the state of 
affairs changed when Nabis had fermented trouble. The actions of Sparta seem to have 
been unexpected as there is no evidence of the allies going to Flamininus with complaints 
of Spartan chicanery. In truth, when Flamininus received the senatorial orders, the 
situation put him in a predicament, He had ended the Second Macedonian War, quieted 
the seething Greek atmosphere, and was prepared to return home when the patres
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prolonged his command. On the one hand, Flamininus had the opportunity to increase
his own gloria by crushing the Spartans. On the other hand, he might lose face if  he
20failed to rectify the problem within the year, and be replaced by another proconsul.
He called a council in Corinth with all of the allies. Flamininus pleaded with 
them to join together and oust the Spartans from Argos. He explained to them the fate of 
the city had little bearing on Rome, except that her claim of freeing Greece would bear a 
tarnish. As the Greeks discussed what action to take, the Aetolian contingent aired past 
grievances and accused Rome of making up excuses for keeping an army in Greece. 
Aristaenus spoke next, persuading the other allies to support war against Nabis. 
Flamininus commanded all of the allies to send auxiliaries to wage the war (Livy 34.22-
25).
The Romans arrived at Argos just after the Spartan garrison had put down an 
attempted coup. A short skirmish with the Spartans resulted in an easy Roman victory. 
Next, Flamininus arranged a council to decide if the forces should besiege Argos. All of 
the allies had voted for the siege when Aristaenus suddenly put forth a motion to carry 
the war into Sparta. Flamininus supported this motion, despite allied opposition. The 
proconsul disbanded the council and made preparations to march on Sparta (Livy 34.22-
26).
Flamininus had decided to take the war south for a swift end to the Spartan
problem to avoid a protracted siege at Argos. He would gain little gloria in just
recapturing Argos. By defeating Nabis himself, Flamininus looked to increase his
0 1auctoritas and Roman influence at the same time.
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To accomplish these goals he had played on Greek fear and hatred to gain their 
backing. At the same time, he knew the Achaeans craved removal of the Spartan threat, 
and that he could count on their support,. As an example of their hatred, the allies later 
called for the utter decimation of Sparta when the war was winding down (Livy 34.33.6). 
By satisfying the allies’ wishes, Flamininus believed he bound them closer to Roman 
interests. Along these same lines, by having the Greeks provide the majority of the 
troops and supplies, he prevented bad memories of Roman cruelty from the First and 
early parts of the Second Macedonian Wars. Seeing a lone Roman army marching 
through Greece plundering and pillaging in the process of defeating Nabis could only 
jeopardize the peace.
Though Livy expounds upon the Spartan War in great detail, we shall condense it 
for the sake of brevity. Flamininus assembled an army of 50,000 men and a navy of 88 
ships. Seeing the writing on the wall, Nabis used terror to suppress any possibility of 
internal dissension, including the execution of 80 men. He then gathered a contingent of
15,000 Spartans and Cretans to face the invader (Livy 34.27). After Flamininus arrived 
in Sparta, Nabis ordered sorties on two separate occasions, both of which failed 
miserably. Flamininus had the surrounding countryside razed in reaction to the Spartan 
offensive.
At the same time, Lucius Flamininus had reduced several coastal towns with the 
navy when he discovered that Gytheum functioned as a fortified storehouse for supplies 
and weapons. Aided by the newly arrived fleets from Rhodes and Pergamum, and a 
4,000-man contingent from Flamininus, Gytheum fell (Livy 34.29).
98
With the fall of Gytheum, Nabis offered to negotiate a settlement. At the 
meeting, Nabis claimed to hold Argos rightfully by the 197 treaty with Philip and by the 
amicitia entered into with Rome, Flamininus denied his claim to amicitia by saying that 
Rome had entered into friendship with Pelops, a legal ruler, not a tyrant. He added that 
Nabis had used force to secure Argos and had attacked the Roman ally Messene and 
aided Philip before changing sides. After Flamininus had finished, Aristaenus advised 
Nabis to lay down his authority in order to reclaim a his good name (Livy 34.31-33).
The next day, Nabis gave up Argos and waited for further conditions. Flamininus 
called the allies together, but they wanted to besiege Lacedaemon and eliminate Nabis. 
Flamininus wanted a peace settlement. He told the allies that Antiochus had come to 
Europe and Rome needed her legions, not to mention the length and difficulty of the 
proposed siege. The allies were not convinced, and Flamininus worried that a long siege 
of the well-fortified Lacedaemon would lead to an extension of war, and he would be 
replaced, losing the gloria. Changing his argument Flamininus asked the allies to contact 
their respective poleis for money and supplies in order to hasten to siege. The allies, 
dismayed by images of jealous and angry citizens, relented and agreed to a peace 
settlement.23
The treaty terms were as follows: withdraw garrisons from Argos and all Argive 
towns; keep only two ships; repatriate all fugitives and captives to their rightful cities; 
return all property to Messene; return women and children to Lacedaemon exiles; return 
property to mercenaries; relinquish towns in Crete to Rome; found no city on non- 
Spartan land; give over five hostages, including Nabis’ own son, to Rome; wage no war
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against Roman allies or Crete; and pay reparations of 100 silver talents immediately, 
followed by 50 talents a year for eight yearsjJLivy 34.35).
The terms upset the tyrant, but when the Spartan people heard them, they became 
outright angry and refused to agree. Nabis called an assembly and roused the people to 
resist, requiring Flamininus to lay siege to the city. After a short time, however, the 
Spartans surrendered and agreed to the peace terms.
Flamininus announced the freedom of Argos at the Nemean Games, though not 
all of his allies were happy. Both the Achaeans and Aetolians complained. The former 
had been given Argos as a part of the league, but they noted that Nabis still held 
Lacedaemon. The latter, accused Rome of being friends of tyranny for allowing Nabis to 
reign. Flamininus approved of the discord because he wanted a balance of states, and 
allowing Sparta to survive in the Peloponnese secured the Achaeans as allies.24
Elections for 194 came around and Scipio reached the consulship for a second 
time. He argued, indirectly, for the chance to take Macedonia as a province since 
Antiochus had invaded Europe with Hannibal as an advisor, and the Aetolians had invited 
the Seleucid king to come to Greece. The Senate rejected his proposal and both consuls 
were allotted Italy as a province. The senators decreed that Flamininus should 
demobilize his troops and return to Rome (Livy 34.44).
Hearing this, Flamininus called a council of all the allies in Corinth, to announce 
that the Roman garrisons would evacuate the Fetters, and all Roman forces would leave 
Greece. When asked about Nabis, Flamininus said he could not allow a strong polis like
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Sparta to be destroyed; its destruction would be a greater injury to freedom than allowing 
a weakened rex to rule over it (Livy 34.48.2-49).
Fanfare followed as Flamininus went to both Chalcis and Demetrias to remove the 
garrisons. He made a brief detour in Thessaly where turmoil prevailed. He calmed the 
disorder and chose all of the senate and magistrates on the basis of property.
Flamininus had fulfilled his vow to the Greeks: no Roman garrisons remained 
stationed anywhere in Hellas. He had won two wars and placed Greece and Macedon 
under “hegemonial imperialism.” Sparta, the Achaean League, Aetolia, Rhodes, 
Pergamum, and Macedon composed the Greek East: a group of states who were clientela 
of Rome and a barrier against the Seleucid monarch. These states, however, were not 
unified. Flamininus had actually erected a pseudo-barrier, nothing substantial. It proved 
unstable when Antiochus marched into Greece.
The “Greek buffer” failed for several reasons. First, Flamininus had incensed the 
Aetolians with his snubs and humiliations. As a measure of revenge, they invited 
Antiochus into Greece to get a bigger share of the spoils. Second, Achaea concentrated 
on the local problem of Nabis rather than on Antiochus, as she still smarted from 
Flamininus leaving the tyrant in power.25 She sent only a token force of 1,000 hoplites 
for garrison duty during the war. Third, and most importantly, no legions remained in 
Greece as a reminder and tool to compel the Greeks to execute the role Flamininus had
- I / '
scripted for them.
It seems logical to conclude that someone with years of experience in Greece, like 
Flamininus had, would have foreseen the flaws in his construction. Yet Flamininus was
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not a Greek, or even a philhellene, and misunderstood the Greeks interpretation of 
amicitia, just as they themselves had misconstrued it. They expected Rome to act as the 
hegemon (war leader), whereas Rome presumed the Greeks would behave as good 
clients, and simply follow Roman instructions. This misunderstanding, compounded by 
bad feelings regarding Greek “freedom” only aided in the failure of Flamininus’ 
settlement.27
In fact, Flamininus parleyed the troop withdrawal from Greece on account of 
gloria and dignitas. He put himself before the state. As has been cited numerous times, 
Flamininus dreaded the theft of his gloria by another, and he hastened the Spartan 
settlement so no one would steal his thunder. He was not negligent or ignorant, but he 
may have not genuinely comprehended the cultural misunderstanding over amicitia, with 
unfortunate results. He believed his settlement benefited Rome, but ambition superseded 
concern over a possible war with Antiochus.28
After the Macedonian War, Flamininus had changed his straightforward military 
approach in dealing with the Hellenes by moving to a more fluid strategy wherein he 
blended negotiation with arms. He did recognize the Greeks reliance on mediation to 
resolve issues and made use of it. By applying the correct tactics in a given situation, 
Flamininus maximized the political benefits for himself. Additionally, it must be noted 
that with Rome fighting wars with the Seleucids, the Aetolians, and the Macedonians in 
the following years, Flamininus’ settlement failed as a long-term Eastern solution for 
Rome, but it proved effective in the short-term for Flamininus. With affairs settled, 
Flamininus crossed back over to Italy, landing at Brundisium and making his way to
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Rome in triumphal fashion, displaying his booty as he went. The Senate voted him a 
triumph, and the magnificent gala lasted for three days (Livy 34.52; Plut. Flam. 13.6).
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CHAPTER FOUR
Flamininus had risen from being a relatively unknown and untested young city 
governor to the conqueror of both Macedonia and the legacy of Alexander the Great in 
just five years. Before he took command in Macedonia, previous Roman consuls had 
stymied effective actions and accomplished little, yet with prodigious tenacity, he had 
pursued his hope of greatness through the fields, mountains, and forests of Hellas using 
almost any means possible until he toppled Philip at Cynoscephalae. Flamininus did not 
stop there, but endeavored to establish a balanced state of affairs in Greece -  so no other 
could steal his gloria -  when the Senate demanded that he confront the problem of the 
encroaching Nabis. Working within a limited timeframe, Flamininus successfully 
exploited the fears of the newly-won Greek allies to quash the Spartan king and to 
organize the affairs of Hellas in a manner acceptable to the Senate before returning to 
Rome.
Flamininus made a tangible demonstration that he had reached his goal of 
becoming a magnus vir by celebrating a magnificent triumph during his homecoming in 
194. He had acted as a successful vector o f imperialism, spreading Roman hegemony to 
the Greco-Macedonian world, but upon returning home he reentered the political arena 
where imperium was only a memory. There, he had power through auctoritas, but had to 
contain his ambitions within a diplomatic setting. In a sense, the entire post-war life of 
Flamininus can be chronologically divided into two distinct parts with phase one 
covering 194-189 and phase two covering 188-174. In the first phase Flamininus 
embarked on a diplomatic career that showed remarkable continuity with his military
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one, where as a negotiator, he coped with the uncertain task of maintaining Greek allied 
support in the face of Seleucid propaganda. His task, and the tools to accomplish it, had 
changed, but his overall objective remained the same: capture gloria to increase his 
auctoritas. After his censorship in 189, Flamininus became inactive for the most part and 
only appears in the ancient sources three times before his death in 174, thus ending his 
past striving after gloria, except in the case of Hannibal’s (discussed below).
From the time of his arrival in Rome, Flamininus enjoyed great popularity and 
influence, outshining even Scipio for a short while as the greatest Roman of his time. His 
ascension had elicited invidia from many, making him an adversary of Scipio and other 
nobiles. Yet despite the difficulties that jealous rivals might have presented, Flamininus 
nevertheless took the forefront, and over the next five years he continued his quest for 
more auctoritas by means of rhetoric and prestige rather than arms. The ancient sources 
provide a number of cases
POSTWAR CAREER: PHASE ONE
After the celebration of his triumph, the senators ratified the terms of his treaty 
without making any changes.1 This is a perfect example of the Senate bequeathing power 
to an individual because they were in no position to amend Flamininus’ decisions. The 
Senate’s lack of knowledge in the situation, their distance from the events, and 
Flamininus’ time in Greece had given him a degree of authority that the Senate did not
question. More importantly, he now possessed a measure of clout as a specialist in
* •  2 Eastern matters that would later allow him to pursue more gloria in Greece.
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Later, when such far-flung campaigns occurred on a regular basis, the Senate did 
not always rubberstamp the treaty conditions proposed by a general. For example, the 
patres made large changes to Tiberius Gracchus’ settlement in Spain. But at this time, 
foreign treaties were too new for the Senate to confidently overrule the commander, and 
thus generals like Scipio and Flamininus essentially finalized their respective peace 
settlements.
The elections of 193 brought Flamininus back into the political melee as his 
brother Lucius Quinctius stood for his first consulship. Quinctius’ strongest opposition 
came from Publius Cornelius, the cousin of Scipio. Cornelius had won recent victories in 
Spain, while Quinctius had won several naval engagements under Flamininus. Even 
though the aspirants had strong personal qualifications for office, they depended on the 
canvassing of their famous relatives. Flamininus and Africanus campaigned for their 
candidates, but the newly won gloria of Flamininus helped to carry the necessary votes, 
and Quinctius took the consulship. Livy himself commented on the growing rivalry 
between Flamininus and Scipio.4 Up to this point, Scipio had been the singular great 
man, but now a novus homo had stolen his place. Scipio had been the model for what a 
man could accomplish, and Flamininus had been a good student. Domestic politics, 
however, soon faded into the background as events in the East recaptured Flamininus’ 
attention and would be the cause of his return to Greece.
In the eyes of most Greeks, Rome stood as the hegemon of the region, while the 
Romans viewed them as amici tied to Rome by bonds of loyalty.5 Yet each side -  to 
simplify -  miscalculated the other’s understanding of the relationship. Rome wanted
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Hellas as a bulwark against other peoples in the East, but without any garrisons left 
behind, a situation about which even some of the senators were dubious.6 Rome already 
faced problems in the West as she sent legions over to deal with Spaniards and Gauls 
each season. Now, a new force had emerged in the East: Antiochus the Great.
Antiochus III came to the throne of the Seleucid Empire in 223 after the murder 
of Seleucus III by his own officers. His cousin Achaeus, a man of skill and vision, set 
Antiochus upon the throne (Polyb. 5.40.4-6). Early on, Antiochus seems to have 
dreamed of recapturing the old empire of his great-great-grandfather, Seleucus I.
He began his campaign in Syria, and success came quickly as his forces took or 
caused the surrender of Samaria, Galilee, Tyre and other areas, until he reached Ceole- 
Syria. This area had been long disputed, and coveted, by both the Ptolemies and 
Seleucids (Polyb. 5.58-62).
Antiochus spent time negotiating with Ptolemy IV, who had built up his army in 
anticipation of conflict. In 217, the kings met at the Battle of Raphia, which ended in 
defeat for Antiochus (Polyb. 5.79-87). He withdrew from Coele-Syria and turned to face 
an internal problem; Achaeus had been managing the armies in Asia Minor and had 
begun to wear a diadem and call himself king. Achaeus’ presumption lost him his 
mercenaries, and left him a rogue figure, and by 213, Antiochus had captured and killed 
him (Polyb. 5.57-58.1, 5.72-78).
Antiochus then turned to his primary aim: the reconquest of the old Seleucid 
empire. He had already retaken parts of western Asia Minor, Persis, Babylon, Media and
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Susiana, and now prepared an eastern campaign to regain the lost Successor territories,
D
either by force or treaty.
In 209, the expedition began. Over the next four years, Antiochus made a treaty 
with Parthia and the Indian Kingdom of Subhagasena, brought Bactria and Soghdiana 
under terms after besieging king Euthydemus for several years, reconstituted Drangiana 
and Archosia into the empire, and made a pact with the Gerrhaean Arabs.9
He returned home in 205 and assumed the title of Great King. Several of his 
“conquests” (Euthydemus, Subhagasena and the Gerrhaeans) had ended in treaties 
without the complete subjugation of his foes. It has been argued that Antiochus had 
economic motives in mind, mostly trade routes and access to gold mines, as the primary 
reason for his anabasis. Though this is possible, I do not think it was Antiochus’ primary 
motivation. If he had simply wanted trade agreements, he would not have spent two 
years (211-210) preparing an army for a massive campaign throughout the eastern part of 
an empire he thought had seceded. His many military engagements, the taking of the title 
Great King, and his eventual move across the Hellespont, all indicate empire as the true 
reason for his campaigning.10
The pact between Philip and Antiochus followed in 205, and the Seleucid ruler 
invaded the Ptolemaic territories of Palestine.11 He annexed Coele-Syria and defeated the 
Egyptians at Panion. By 197, he had taken more coastal territory in Cilicia and Caria, 
and invaded parts of Pergamon. Next, Antiochus crossed the Hellespont and started to 
set up a base in abandoned the Lysimacheia,12
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When the Seleucid king entered Europe, the Romans began to take serious notice. 
Previously in 200, a Roman embassy had stopped in Egypt to help resolve a dispute 
between Antiochus and Ptolemy, to prevent a possible conflict that could have spread 
into the Aegean while Rome battled Philip. Gruen refutes the theory that the envoys gave 
Antiochus an ultimatum to curtail his possible invasion of Egypt.13 At the time 
Antiochus entered Coele-Syria, Rome had shown little interest in the area, beyond 
stability.14 Even when Attalus had asked for aid against Antiochus in 197, the Senate had 
sent only an embassy to request that Antiochus, as a friend of Rome, not assault another 
friend of the populi Romani (Livy 32.8.9-16). Rome had her attention focused on 
Macedon and the West; Antiochus did not threaten her interests.
In the spring of 196, however, with the Seleucid forces rebuilding Lysimacheia on 
the European side of the Hellespont, the Senate sent an embassy to confront Antiochus. 
The embassy told Antiochus to stay out of all the poleis in Asia Minor, to remove his 
army from Thrace, and to evacuate Europe. In reply, Antiochus claimed hereditary 
entitlement to the areas he invested, and denied the Roman envoys’ other accusations of 
belligerency toward Rome. The frustrated emissaries returned home while Antiochus 
continued with his expansion. Rome had proclaimed the Asian poleis free as a check 
against possible Seleucid incursions -  and to validate a war if necessary -  but she had not 
been prepared to refute the justifications that Antiochus had given for his expansion. 
With matters in Greece unresolved, and warfare flaring up in the West, the Senate did not 
take action against Antiochus for several years.
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Flamininus saw a potential for more gloria in a campaign against Antiochus, but 
knew that he must wait ten years before being eligible to stand again for the consulship. 
His role in Rome had changed. With his experience and reputation in Greece, the Senate 
believed that Flamininus possessed expertise in dealing with Eastern affairs. While other 
Romans prepared for war with Antiochus, Flamininus played an important diplomatic 
role in the early stages of the war, but at the same time he acted to enhance his own 
auctoritas.
By 193, an embassy from Antiochus had arrived in Rome to enact a friendly 
alliance. The envoys informed the Senate that they had no right to tell Antiochus which 
Asian poleis he could involve himself and which he could not. The Senate appointed 
Flamininus to answer the Syrians, and he told the envoys that Antiochus had two choices. 
If the Seleucids abandoned their positions in Europe, then Rome would not interfere in 
Seleucid dealings with any of the Asian poleis, however, if they refused to leave Europe, 
then Rome would defend her allies in Asia Minor. The envoys claimed that Antiochus 
had hereditary rights to territory in Greece, and that the Romans had no right to prevent 
him from reclaiming them. Flamininus rebutted this argument by saying that the Greeks 
had been promised freedom under Rome and it could not be abandoned for Seleucid rule. 
The Senate told the envoys to pick, but they declined, as they did not have the authority 
to make that decision, which was subsequently postponed as Rome sent a three-man 
embassy to meet with Antiochus (Livy 34.57-59; Diod. 28.15).
Flamininus’ reply clearly revealed the truth behind Roman propaganda: Greek 
freedom depended on Roman foreign policy and Rome did not hold eleutheria
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sacrosanct. His answer demonstrated Rome’s desire to maintain a balance in the East, 
but at the same time, a willingness to become involved in Seleucid affairs. Flamininus 
had not issued a rerum repetitio, but Antiochus would lose much prestige if he followed 
the terms. Imperialism remained the vague, uncharted policy of Rome and Flamininus’ 
answer demonstrated a readiness to continue Rome’s incursions into the East.
News of several developments came to Rome. First, Hannibal had fled Carthage 
and allied himself with Antiochus. Second, it was rumored that the Aetolians, still bitter 
over being snubbed in the Second Macedonian War, had invited Antiochus to free them 
from Rome. Rome reacted by sending an embassy, headed by Flamininus, to Greece to 
shore up support and prevent any poleis from siding with the Seleucid King (Livy 
35.23.3-5)
In just two years, the situation in Greece had changed drastically. Nabis had 
broken the treaty and attacked areas along the Spartan coast. The Achaeans, meeting at 
the council of Sicyon, wanted to take action, but waited for Flamininus to advise them. 
Here the Greeks deferred to Rome, their hegemon, and particularly to Flamininus, whose 
reputation still held much influence. Flamininus replied that the Achaeans should wait 
for the Roman fleet under Atilius to arrive (Livy 35.22.1-4). The Greeks were split on 
whether to obey, until Philopoemen -  who had become strategos for the fourth time -  
decided not to linger for Rome. Mobilizing the Achaeans, he went after Nabis, and 
following a short campaign, the Achaeans defeated the Spartans. The people celebrated 
the achievements of Philopoemen as greater than those of Flamininus (Livy 35.25-30; 
Plut .Flam. 13.2, Philo. 15.2-3).
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Thus had the ethereal nature of the Roman settlement begun to show. The Greeks 
had successfully used the Romans to get rid of Philip, but with the removal of Roman 
might from Hellas, they then returned to their own domestic interests.15 Here, the 
emptiness of Flamininus’ propaganda began to reveal itself to the Romans. Livy briefly 
mentioned that the embassy did not meet with the Achaeans because their attack on Nabis 
showed their loyalty to the Roman position (35.31.1-3). Though this statement has some 
truth, it shows mostly that Flamininus was too trusting of them and did not recognize 
their own ambitions.16
While the Achaeans waged war, Flamininus and the other envoys traveled 
throughout Attica, Chalcis, and Thessaly to prevent losing allies to the Aetolian 
exhortations to join Antiochus. Upon arriving at Demetrias, Flamininus attended the 
Magnetes Council, who debated whether to join Rome or Antiochus. Anti-Roman 
council members saw the post-war treatment of Philip as too lenient, and Flamininus 
angrily reminded them that troops under his command had freed the city from a 
Macedonian garrison, an act that had resulted in peace. He also reminded them to keep 
Macedon as an ally with the approach of the Seleucid monarch. The Magnetes sided with 
Rome, and the rabble-rousers fled to Aetolia (Livy 35.31.1-8).
The Panaetolian Council met to decide whether they should support Rome or 
Antiochus. Menippus, the Seleucid delegate, told the Aetolians that Antiochus would 
restore true freedom to Greece, not liberty under Roman hegemony. The Athenian envoy 
told the council not to decide hastily, reminding them of the alliance and services of 
Rome, which had freed them of Philip, and that Flamininus himself was approaching to
115
settle the affair. The Aetolians, however, voted to support Antiochus (Livy 35.32-33.1- 
2). Shortly thereafter, Flamininus arrived and addressed the council. He reminded them 
of their history as treaty-breakers with Rome, and urged them to dispatch ambassadors to 
the Senate to reconcile the affair or they would have war with Rome (Livy 33.49.9). 
Thoas, the chief Aetolian, countered Flamininus’ argument by reiterating Antiochus’ 
claim to bring freedom, and this carried the opinion of the council. They decided to 
support Antiochus (Livy 35.33).
Flamininus did well in Demetrias by falling back on his reputation, but he failed 
at the Aetolian council because of his past history with them.17 He had downplayed their 
contribution to his victory at Cynoscephalae, had claimed land for Rome that they had 
claimed, and had refused their petitions for the return of Pharsalus, Leucas and other 
cities, as per an earlier treaty. The Aetolians viewed their alliance with the Romans as 
detrimental. Flamininus’ own dignitas had demanded that he not bear the earlier insults 
of the Aetolians -  the plundering of the Macedonian camp at Cynoscephalae and the 
attack on his generalship -  but in the process, he had lost their future support.
The inner council of the Aetolians planned to seize the cities of Lacedaemon, 
Chalcis and Demetrias by arms to prove themselves to Antiochus. The attacks, however, 
failed and the Aetolians did not capture either Lacedaemon or Chalcis. Flamininus sent 
Galba to Demetrias, hoping to convince them to remain Roman allies before an Aetolian 
force arrived, but the conference between Galba and the Magnetes ended badly, and the 
Magnetes went over to the Aetolians (Livy 35.34-38, 35,42.4-5).
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Meanwhile, Antiochus had crossed over to Demetrias with a small force, and the 
Aetolians rallied around him. In an attempt to undermine the Roman position, Antiochus 
and the Aetolians sent ambassadors to the Achaean council at Aegium where Flamininus 
resided. The Syrian ambassador claimed that the might of Antiochus was greater than 
either Hannibal or Philip, and the best choice Rome could make was not to take part in 
the coming war. The Aetolian envoy, Archidamus, echoed the words of the Seleucids, 
and then harshly insulted Flamininus and the Romans. Flamininus called the envoys’ 
words empty and their might insignificant. He reminded the Achaeans of past Roman 
help and their loyalty to the alliance, and they overwhelmingly supported him. He had 
played to a receptive crowd, as they had directly benefited from the defeat of Philip, and 
saw no reason to chance fate by going over to Antiochus.18
Up to this point, Flamininus and the other envoys had been following their 
assignment. As Livy mentioned, the Senate had ordered the ambassadors to use 
auctoritas to keep the support of the allies, as none of them possessed imperium (35.23.4- 
5). For the most part they had been successful, except for the loss of Demetrias. Most 
importantly, they had prevented the Achaeans from changing sides, which could have 
caused many others to follow. Flamininus productively had used his auctoritas to 
contribute to the war effort. For example, he had ordered King Eumenes to deploy 500 
men to Chalcis after the Aetolians had attacked it (Livy 35.38.1-3). Later, he 
commanded the Achaeans to send 500 troops to both Chalcis and Piraeus to keep those 
cities on the Roman side (Livy 35,50.3). Just his presence in Athens put down a bribery 
conspiracy favoring Antiochus (Livy 35.50.4), and without force of arms at his
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immediate disposal, he had made steady progress in keeping the Greek poleis as allies. 
After Antiochus captured Chalcis, Rome officially declared war (Zon. 9.19-20).
Flamininus’ success in effectively using diplomacy came from the power he 
enjoyed because of his auctoritas, and at the same time he accumulated more gloria and 
laus by the effectual manipulation of the Greeks to the benefit of Rome. Yet, he was the 
same man who had taken great risks in the Second Macedonian and Spartan Wars to 
become a Magnus Vir, and whatever prestige he had gained so far as an ambassador
paled before his previous accomplishments. With this new war in progress, Flamininus
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yearned for even more gloria and began to explore the vagaries of his office and the 
nature of his duties. The nebulous nature of his assignment coupled with his auctoritas 
impelled Flamininus to test the limits of his power.
No specific mention of the Senate’s wishes exists in Livy’s text, beyond using 
auctoritas to keep the allies on the Roman side. Obviously, one can infer that Flamininus 
looked out for Rome’s best interests, but soon he began to pay attention to his own as 
well.19 To illustrate, the Achaeans were besieging Messene, a polis that had refused to 
join the league, since they sympathized with the Aetolians. The Messenians sent to 
Flamininus with a proposal of surrender, and Flamininus instructed Diophanes -  the 
Achaean strategos -  to raise the siege, which Diophanes did. Flamininus then hurried to 
Messene, to admonish Diophanes for acting without receiving Roman advice. Then 
Flamininus had the Achaean army disbanded (Livy 36.31.1-8).
Flamininus’ behavior certainly seems odd, but he had gained control over an 
important city, which benefited Rome and secured him a little more gloria. This action
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definitely favored an imperialistic stance, and unfortunately, it had been at the expense of 
their strongest Greek ally. Flamininus had likely exercised extra-legal authority to secure 
the city and his actions may possibly be seen as damaging to Rome’s status in Greece, 
but he still wore the mantle of the “liberator” and the Greeks did as he asked.
Shortly after this, Flamininus addressed the Achaean Council and insisted that 
they return the island of Zacynthos to Roman custody, asserting that the island had 
passed down to the Achaeans illegally, and it belonged to Rome by right of conquest over 
Antiochus. Flamininus further convinced his audience by reminding them that expanding 
outside the mainland would only endanger their safety. Opposition folded and 
Flamininus acquired Zacynthos for Rome.
Flamininus had put his auctoritas to good use and Rome had profited by 
acquiring a strategic island in the Adriatic. Once again, Flamininus may be accused of 
stepping beyond the normal mandate of an ambassador by obtaining Zacynthos, but he 
simply negotiated from a much stronger position than others because of his reputation in 
Greece. Flamininus hoped to increase his own auctoritas by increasing Roman 
hegemony over Greece. Though he did not march onto the battlefield, he pursued gloria 
anyway.
It may be argued that Flamininus had accomplished a diplomatic coup by 
annexing the island.21 He had used his auctoritas in an imperialistic fashion and the state 
had benefited. This action may have caused invidia and consternation among some of his 
peers, but the majority of nobiles accepted him doing these important things for Rome, 
even if he had accomplished them in a somewhat dubious fashion. At this point no one
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would find fault in his deeds; this was not the first century where the powerful 
individuals like Pompey challenged senatorial power.
Another good example of Flamininus testing the limits of his power involves his 
intervention in the Roman siege of Naupactus in Aetolia. Manius Acilius, the consul, had 
besieged the city for two months and was close to destroying it. Flamininus crossed over 
to Naupactus and dressed down Acilius for wasting time attacking a city while Philip had 
reorganized his forces and had begun to reincorporate lost territory into his state. He also 
told the consul that the loss of the Aetolian people would leave an easily exploitable 
power vacuum for Philip. Acilius did not want to leave, but deferred to Flamininus, who 
told the fawning Aetolians to request a truce and then send delegates to the Senate (Livy 
36.34-35.6).
In this case, Flamininus had definitely transgressed boundaries. He had no 
imperium, yet had convinced Acilius to defer to him, showing that his auctoritas was 
great enough to surpass a man actually wielding imperium. Yet this episode does not 
demonstrate elements of imperialism, but just the opposite as Flamininus prevented a 
strategically positioned polis from being captured. Both Livy (36.34.1-3) and Plutarch 
{Flam. 15.4-5) say that Flamininus did not want to see the genocide of the Aetolians, 
which seems an overstatement. Possibly Flamininus thought that this defeat might 
weaken the Aetolians enough to allow Philip an easy conquest, if  taken to its conclusion. 
Flamininus’ actions, however, betray his true motivation in that he was competing against 
Acilius to regain dignitas. The peace he had recently arranged had proven to be 
ineffective as Antiochus threatened Greece and the Aetolians were already fighting the
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Romans. Flamininus saw the chance of both reclaiming some dignitas in the wake of the 
ruined settlement and stealing away some of Acilius’ gloria. To the Greeks, Flamininus 
embodied a foreigner who understood Hellenic politics and culture, whereas Acilius 
represented a typical Roman bent on conquest. Thus, taking advantage of Aetolian 
perceptions of himself versus Acilius, he used his auctoritas and special relationship with 
the Hellenes to filch the victory from Acilius. Flamininus had enjoyed power for a long 
time and still wanted to exercise it. At times, his actions demonstrate a belief that his 
authority superceded the mores and laws that governed Roman politics. His ambitious 
character, naturally complimented by Roman imperialism, began to make Flamininus 
look beyond the limits of individual duty, in favor of personal gain
The envoys had stabilized the allied situation, which left all o f Hellas supporting 
Rome, with the exception of the Aetolians. With the diplomatic work in Greece 
concluded, Flamininus returned to Rome in 190. Although other Romans like Acilius 
and Lucius Scipio would soon celebrate triumphs of their own for victories over 
Antiochus, Flamininus had managed to preserve, and likely augment, his auctoritas. One 
last goal remained: to capture the censorship and join the elite nobiles.
Flamininus reached the pinnacle of the cursus honorum in 189, becoming censor 
with Marcus Claudius Marcellus. Illustrious candidates like Acilius, Scipio, and Cato 
had entered the election, but a scandal concerning booty embroiled Acilius and Cato in a 
feud. At one point, the tribunes -  Publius Sempronius Gracchus and Gaius Sempronius 
Rutilius -  even threatened to veto the entire election. In the end, Flamininus proved 
victorious and defeated Scipio once again (Livy 37.57.9-58.2). Although, Flamininus
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accomplished little during his tenure as censor (Livy 38.28.1-4), attaining that august 
magistracy remains the salient point because being censor mattered more in terms of 
prestige than the actual activities of the nffir,e-holder. After winning the crowning 
magistracy at 41 years of age, Flamininus commenced a different phase in his public life. 
Whereas previously he had dared much and constantly been in the public eye in order to 
climb to the top of the cursus honorum, after his censorship, he became mostly inactive 
politically for the remainder of his life, and subsequently disappeared from historical 
view for five years.
POSTWAR CAREER: PHASE TWO
Accomplishing little in the five years following his censorship, it seemed that his 
star had waned. The likely reason was that he had already achieved most available 
honors and further competition would risk diminishing his status, and so he became more 
selective in using his influence in front of the public. Younger men might battle for 
honors, but Flamininus did not overtly exert his auctoritas, as he understood the ferocity 
of invidia and believed that trying to snatch more gloria after such an exceptional career 
would probably cause him problems. As a result, he emerges only three times in the 
ancient sources after 189, though these examples do not themselves show a radically 
different approach to his using auctoritas
In 184, Marcus Porcius Cato held the censorship and expelled Lucius Flamininus 
from the Senate, charging him with abuse of his consular powder: Lucius had killed a 
young Gaul to impress his Carthaginian lover, Philippus. Flamininus had stood at his 
brother’s side to defend him when Cato made the story public, but Cato’s tale had
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brought popular support to the attack on Lucius, and it injured Flamininus’ dignitas in the 
process.23 Incensed by Cato’s attack, Flamininus used his influence and retaliated by 
gathering together a group of supporters angry with Cato, and had the funds for some of 
his public works projects cut. He also induced several tribunes to fine Cato two talents 
for “injury” to the people (Plut. Cato. 19.1-2). Flamininus not only found himself 
indirectly under attack on account of Cato’s morality power play, but the attack had 
injured the Quinctii gens as well. Flamininus had taken it upon himself to recover some 
of his family -  not to mention his own -  dignitas. If he was no longer vying for the 
consulship or censorship, his previous extensive successes still made him a convenient 
target for inimicitiae. The fact that he had the clout to successfully retaliate against Cato 
demonstrates the great amount of auctoritas that he still possessed.
In 183, the Senate sent the seasoned Flamininus as an ambassador to King 
Prusias, who was rumored to be fermenting war against Eumenes and giving refuge to 
Hannibal. The assignment fired Flamininus’ old ambition and he saw it as a chance to 
regain some prestige by urging the weak-willed Prusias to surrender Hannibal to him. 
Prusias agreed and sent soldiers to capture the Carthaginian. Although Hannibal had 
prepared seven escape routes, the soldiers discovered them all, and rather than return to 
Rome in chains, Hannibal drank poison.24 When news of the incident reached Rome, the 
consensus was split between those who supported Flamininus and those who saw his 
actions as a violation of his duty as an ambassador. Still others saw him as someone 
trying to steal away the gloria of the Scipios (Plut. Flam. 21.1-6). No longer perceived as
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the successful young conqueror, Flamininus had misread the situation and not only had 
failed to recapture some of his faded glory, but had also lost support in the process.
After his altercation with Hannibal, Flamininus disappeared for another nine 
years. Likely, he attended the Senate meetings and took part in day-to-day political 
affairs, but no evidence exists for further military or diplomatic missions. He had bucked 
against the Senate and cultural norms in many ways: the evacuation of Greece in 194, the 
acquisition of Zacynthos in 191, the usurpation of Acilius’ imperium at Naupactus, taking 
on royal Hellenistic trappings while in Greece (see below), miscalculating popular 
reaction by his attack on Hannibal, and allowing himself the title of imperator. It is 
possible that Flamininus suffered a decline in status during this time because of the 
cumulative effect of all these actions, or perhaps, his abortive attempt to resurrect his 
diminished career convinced him that his time as the foremost Roman had passed, and 
thus he intentionally faded into the background that was the oligarchy.
In contrast, Scipio had become too bold for his enemies too bear. He had returned 
to prominence as legate to Lucius Cornelius, although he was the true commander. With 
the victory over Antiochus at Magnesia, his auctoritas had grown to such an extent that 
invidia among his peers could not be satisfied with anything but a censure of the great 
man. Indicted for fraud, he saved himself only by calling upon the memory of his 
services to Rome. Yet at the same time his renown saved him, it became the reason for 
his final demise in the public arena. He died in self-exile.
Although, Scipio had proven to be Flamininus’ example so many times in the 
past, this time Flamininus did not emulate him. Instead Flamininus did subtle things to
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deflect covetousness and odium, such as not taking another cognomen as Scipio 
Africanus had done. Rather, Flamininus avoided blatant abuse of his auctoritas. He 
attacked Cato in a culturally acceptable fashion, and let his brother fall from grace. Also, 
he may have attempted little during his censorship in order to avoid too much attention. 
Cato’s famous censorship brought with it much hostile reaction. In the end, Flamininus 
had walked a humbler path, avoiding the public emasculation that Scipio eventually 
suffered.
Flamininus appears one more time in the ancient sources. His last recorded act 
took place in 174, when he honored the memory of his father with a series of gladiatorial 
games and banquets (Livy 41.28.11). Some time after this, Flamininus died, but the 
ancient sources record no specifics about his death, except that it was peaceful (Plut. 
Flam. 21.8).
The second phase in Flamininus’ postwar career had the feel of a man satisfied 
with his lot for the most part -  except for the brief episode with Hannibal -  confirming 
that Flamininus had chosen wisely in 188, to opt for a more subdued political existence. 
By taking up the livelihood of a regular member of the senatorial class, he continued to 
affect dealings in Rome and could enjoy the success he had garnered. Flamininus had 
achieved all that a Roman could desire. He had become consul, celebrated a triumph 
after winning two wars, developed into a major political and diplomatic figure, and 
served as censor. His tenacious and unerring pursuit for gloria made him a notable 
personage in the pantheon of great Romans much as he had hoped that he would.
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CHAPTER FOUR ENDNOTES
1. Livy 34.52; Eckstein, General, 308-310
2. Badian puts forward the idea that Rome sent men with ‘Eastern experience”’ over 
to Greece to handle diplomacy (<Clientela, 63-6, 90). Gruen refutes Badian’s 
argument, but concedes that Flamininus was an exception to the rule (203-49).
3. App. Iber. 43-44; Badian, Foreign Clientela, 123.
4. Livy (35.10) comments that the people were envious and tired of Africanus, while 
Flamininus was a fresh face. But, the rivalry was more than that. Africanus had 
tried to take Macedonia away from Flamininus in 194, and in 189, he ran against 
him for the censorship.
5. Lintott, 33-4.
6. Africanus argued vehemently against the evacuation of troops from the “Fetters” 
(Livy 34.43.4-5; Eckstein, General, 309-10) informing thepatres that it only 
invited the incursion o f Sclcucid arms.
7. Green, 288.
8. Polyb. 10.27-31, 10.49; Green, 293.
9. Polyb. 11.39,13.9.
10. Green, 294-5.
11. The pact has been discussed in the Introduction, n. 48.
12. Polyb. 16.18-9; Livy 33.19.8, 32.19.8-16; Green, 303-5.
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13. Gruen (680-2) finds the tradition of the ultimatum (App. Mac. 4; Just. 30.2.8) to 
have little weight, as it is not found in Livy and Polybius states that the embassy 
only went to reconcile the two kings (16.27.5).
14. Green, 304; Gruen, 680.
15. Gruen, 464-7.
16. Gruen’s basic thesis of The Hellenistic World and the Coming o f  Rome is that the 
Greeks often manipulated the Romans and intrigued in their own politics, despite 
the presence of Rome.
17. Eckstein, General, 292-3.
18. Livy 35.48-50.5. The Achaeans gave aid, yet it signaled anything but full-fledged 
support for Roman action: they provided only a small number of soldiers.
19. Badian, “Philhellenism,” 317.
20. Livy 36.31.9-32. Gruen (170-1) portrays the Achaeans as somewhat nervous 
about Flamininus’ request, and they offered little resistance.
21. Gruen believes that Flamininus took the island because he had the support of the 
Senate (170-1). Rome had briefly occupied the island during the First 
Macedonian War, but it had not been mentioned since that time (Livy 26.24.15). 
No evidence exists to back a Roman interest in Zacynthos until Flamininus’ 
surprising request. This was not part of some senatorial directive, but only 
Flamininus’ attempt to snatch more gloria.
22. Plutarch {Flam. 15.2) alleged that Acilius had made Flamininus his lieutenant. 
Livy, however, provides no evidence for this assertion, and specifically noted that 
the ambassadors had no imperium.
23. Livy 39.42.5-43; Plut. Flam. 19. The accounts differ in details and Livy provides 
the more believable of the two.
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24. This story is found in both Livy (39.51) and Plutarch {Flam. 20). I followed 
Plutarch, as Livy gives several possible reasons for the eventual suicide of 
Hannibal, including Plutarch’s, but does not want to accuse Flamininus of 
following his ambition over possible instructions of the Senate.
25. Livy 39.52.9.
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CONCLUSION
Flamininus had a remarkable career because he effectively took risks, survived in 
the hostile world of Roman politics, and exploited the mechanisms of imperialism to 
advance his own interests. He had more than succeeded on the individual level by 
producing a string of accomplishments that quickly placed him among the select few 
nobiles of his time. Flamininus efficiently had manipulated political situations such as 
forcing his reelection in 197, finagling the Macedonian peace settlement, and winning the 
censorship. He also properly managed military affairs as in the cases of defeating Philip 
at Cynoscephalae, acquiring Achaean support, and vanquishing Nabis. At every turn he 
had exploited the environment and instruments of Roman imperialism and built for 
himself the career he had envisaged.
Being a virum magnum required climbing to the top of the cursus honorum, which 
Flamininus did by leaps and bounds. Benefiting Rome and increasing his auctoritas 
always remained his goal, which he pursued with an amazing, singular focus despite 
virtually all obstacles, even to the disregard of the state’s best interests at times. 
Flamininus represents a typical member of the nobiles, who selfishly chased after 
auctoritas to glorify himself, and Rome by proxy.
All nobiles strove within a cultural system regulated by natural checks and 
balances to prevent anyone from gaining too much renown. In the aftermath of the 
Hannibalic War, the Republic had expanded, necessitating the Senate’s commission of 
generals with overseas commands and almost unlimited authority, to actualize the will of
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Rome. Victories abroad provided them with gloria and wealth few others could equal. 
Following the example of Scipio in Africa, Flamininus exploited the situation in Greece 
to become a Great Man. He had not taken a unique course of action, but had helped to 
blaze a trail for others like Lucius Aemilius Paullus, Lucius Mummius Achaicus, Scipio 
Africanus Minor, and Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus. Flamininus never 
looked out for the best interests of Hellas, except when Roman and Greek concerns 
coincided. Philhellenism did not dictate his dealings in Greece anymore than it 
influenced Paullus’ activities after Pynda. As a product of his time and culture, 
Flamininus looked after Rome and himself, not the conquered.
Imperialism increased as commanders attempted to reach their goals. Victory 
became the sole prerequisite to obtain greatness and, as such, generals feverishly toiled to 
vanquish Rome’s enemies and bring the defeated under Roman control. As men 
struggled to find gloria in foreign lands, they increased Roman supremacy by their 
victories. Flamininus himself fostered imperialism in the East, which would make Rome 
the undisputed master of the Eastern Mediterranean within fifty years. His removal of all 
the Roman garrisons from Greece and his open-ended declaration of complete Greek 
liberty, including the Asian poleis, invited a clash with the empire-building Seleucids. 
Also, the hegemonial settlement he used to end the Second Macedonian War lacked strict 
enough guidelines and enforcement, which accidentally precipitated two major conflicts 
in Hellas.
To reach, and remain, at the apex of Roman politics, Flamininus had forced the 
limits of his power throughout his career. In the beginning he competed against Scipio’s
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accomplishments by imitating them. He called himself imperator at the Isthmian Games 
in 196 and had gold coins bearing his portrait minted -  both an echo of Scipio.1 What he 
unintentionally gained that Scipio had not was his own cult in Chalcis due to Greek hero 
cults. He had procured honors, which inspired invidia and mistrust among some of his 
fellow oligarchs, and ambition that reaped rewards of this magnitude, simply on the 
personal level, raised the standard others would have to reach to be considered great men. 
He ended the Macedonian War with a treaty similar to Scipio’s settlement of the 
Hannibalic WTar. After his triumph he sought to make himself useful to the state and 
acquire more gloria by increasing Roman authority during his diplomatic work in 
Greece. Here, he may have overstepped his authority, but success is difficult to argue 
with. Even after he had held the censorship and assumed a more understated role, the 
appeal of reputation enticed him to try once more to obtain gloria by attempting to 
capture Hannibal.
Flamininus, however, evaded an ending like Scipio’s. He had done much for 
Rome, and had profited handsomely in return. By curbing his ambition and defending 
himself at the right moments, he retained a sizable amount of power and influence 
throughout his career. Flamininus heeded the checks and balances, and the Senate left 
him alone, for the most part. His actions rarely interfered with the rule of the state or 
directly threatened its security, but he did chip away at the Roman political foundation, 
just as Scipio had done with his contraventions.
A new generation of Romans had to accomplish more than their predecessors to 
gain similar acclaim. Flamininus did not, however, act against his culture, but in
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accordance with it. He pursued greatness, and in so doing, ironically revealed a 
weakness of the state. Imperialism and the pursuit of gloria complimented each other in 
the beginning, but in the later Republic, competition became fiercer, the prizes to be won 
even greater, and as the state grew, the imposition of senatorial controls eventually 
became impossible.3 In the end, the Senate would be forced to bow before the great men, 
who had armies at their disposal instead of mere auctoritas. These seeds of revolution 
were planted by the culture, nurtured by empire in the age of Scipio and Flamininus, and 
bore fruit under later leaders such as Marius, Sulla and Pompey.
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CONCLUSION ENDNOTES
1. Livy 33.32.5; Scullard, Africanus, 76-7, 260-1, n,57. Scullard believes Scipio 
used the term to gain favor with his men.
2. Plut. Flam. 16.3-4. Although Flamininus became the first Roman to have a hero 
cult dedicated to him, it was actually an old Greek tradition. To illustrate, 
Brasidas had been honored at Amphipolis in 424, the Spartan Lysander on Samos 
in 404, and Dion at Syracuse in 357. The Macedonian monarchy also seems to 
have had a royal hero cult.
3. Mary Beard and Michael Crawford, Rome in the Late Republic, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1985), 68-71. Rosenstein, 177-8.
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